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In a previous s t u d y ^ the Commission attempted to make a cr i t ical 
appraisal ©f the general guidelines of trade policy in the Latin America 
countries, both from the point of view of how the aims of trade policy 
were defined and the general trend they indicated, and from that of the 
shortcomings that were observable in the machinery for achieving them,, 
Attention was then drawn to the need to review and re-orient the principles 
and objectives which should guide the formulation and conduct of trade 
policy, in order to convert i t into a more efficient instrument for 
promoting economic growth and social progress in these countries and thus 
fully Recognizing the validity of the principle that the developing countries 
themselves must bear the main responsibility for their economic, and 
social development. Moreover, by stressing the importance of this 
re-orientation the document brought out one of the most serious examples 
of the narrow horizons which s t i l l seem to bind the thinking of so many 
countries about what can be achieved through a well-directed internal 
effort to mobilize domestic resources as eff iciently as possible* For a 
long time a large number of countries have gone on thinking that most 
government action should be centred on obtaining trade concessions and 
financial aid from developed countries to enable them to overcome the 
rigidity of an economic and social structure to change which l i t t l e could 
be done on the domestic front. The discussions in UNCTAD and GATT, where 
the action and efforts to promote a new system of trade relations and 
greater international economic co-operation were concentrated, thus 
became for many developing countries an activity which almost completely 
and exclusively absorbed their capacity for action. 
It is not the intention here to diminish the merit or importance of 
the international measures that may be adopted in favour of developing 
countries. In the international sphere the policies pursued by the 
developed countries provide a general framework which can make it easier 
or more di f f i cult for developing countries to adopt their own policies. 
y "La politica comercial exterior de America Latina", (E/CN. 12/316), 




Accordingly, anything that changes the "rules of the gamen, which up to 
\ 
now have been worked out exclusively by. the developed countries in line 
with their political and economic interests, alters the general framework 
and therefore makes i t easier for the developing countries to take 
advantage ef the potential resources which they have at their disposal. 
But the demands and preoccupations involved in such international action 
should not absorb each country's capacity for action to the exclusion 
of a l l else« The experience in some developing countries, which through 
persistent and disciplined action have given their external sector a 
dynamic impetus that i t formerly lacked, is proof of what can be achieved 
i f action to overcome development problems takes the form fundamentally 
of a national e f fort , expressed in the adoption of appropriate internal . 
policies* What is required, in the last analysis, is to give practical 
form to the well-worn idea that international co-operation in the f ield 
of trade and external financing, however important i t may be, is not a 
substitute for internal action, but a complement of it» 
These observations seem to be timely, not because there is less interest 
in discussing possible solutions to the developing countries1 problems 
forums in international, but precisely because much more has actually 
been done to solve them in the last few years» The summary that is given 
below of the huge number of suggestions, proposals and recommendations 
presented to international agencies or adopted by them shows that in a 
great many cases the same topics are s t i l l being discussed and the 
recommendations being adopted are only repetitions of those approved 
years ago; but. most of them are never translated into specific action 
programmes or measures likely to produce the desired results. It i s 
true that some progress is being made, as is shown for example by the 
change in the negative attitude adopted by some of the most important 
of the developed countries at the f irst UNCTAD session in 1964 in relation 
to the proposal to establish a system of general preferences. This , 
proposal gradually won support until f inally, six years later, an 
agreement to establish this system was concluded. In other f ields, 
however, where agreement concerning principles and objectives was reached 





been side-stepped because the countries which approved them do not consider 
themselves bound to put them into practice. The results of this analysis 
should not lead to the disheartening conclusion that international action 
is ineffective, however; on the contrary, i t should produce the conviction 
that a great effort of persuasion is s t i l l necessary to translate what 
has hitherto been kept on the plane of a declaration of good intentions 
into facts and concrete action. 
At the end of 1970 the States members of the United Nations resolved 
to devote the decade that is now beginning to the achievement of tasks 
and objectives which were not or could not be achieved in the First 
United Nations Development Decade. General Assembly resolution 2626 (XXV) 
on the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations 
Development Decade establishes the goals and objectives which a l l the 
Member States undertake to f u l f i l and the proposed policy measures for 
attaining "the fundamental objectives enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations twenty-five years ago to create conditions of stability 
and well-being and to ensure a minimum standard of living consistent with 
2/ 
human dignity through economic and social progress and development".-'. 
Of the policy measures on international trade and financial resources 
for development included in this resolution, there is not one that has 
not previously been the subject of some recommendation or decision in 
UNCTAD or GATT or their subsidiary organs. Probably this could not be 
otherwise since the development strategy must reflect the general consensus 
of al l the countries which have committed themselves to take part in this 
enterprise. The value of this resolution, which summarizes the goals 
and objectives and the policy measures for the Second Development Decade, 
i 
does not, therefore, l ie in a new approach but in the Governments1 political 
uriJJLand collective determination to carry out the commitments they have 
assumed as a solemn undertaking. 
In examining international action in the field of trade and financial 
resources for development, reference will be made in each case to the 
policy measures envisaged in the International Development Strategy for the 
Second United Nations Development Decade, in order to give the background of 
these measures and show what progress has been achieved in discussing and 
implementing them. 
2/ First paragraph of the preamble of General Assembly resolution 2626 (XXV)« 




1, International commodity agreements 
In the field of policy measures on international trade, the Development 
Strategy ^ reaffirms that international commodity agreements should be 
concluded and refers specifically to international action in respect of 
a certain number of commodities agreed upon in resolution 16 (II) adopted 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at its second 
session. The resolution fixed dates for the conclusion of negotiations 
on sugar and cocoa and recommended that studies and consultations be 
carried out in order to determine what action could be adopted in respect 
of a broad range of other commodities, such as bananas, citrus fruit , 
oilseeds, oils and fats, hard fibres, cotton, tobacco, iron ore, tungsten g 
and manganese. The part of this action programme referring to sugar has 
been successfully completed; but the negotiations on cocoa have bogged 
down, and the studies and consultations on the other commodities have 
reached varying stage« of completion. It is obviously not feasible to 
negotiate international agreements on al l these commodities, although 
the results of inter-governmental consultations in respect of many of 
them may lead to the negotiation of more or less formal agreements to 
meet crit ical market situations or to solve special problems affecting 
international trade in specific products. 
In reaffirming the usefulness of international commodity arrangements 
as an appropriate policy measure in world commodity trade, the Development 
Strategy continues a tradition of more, than twenty years1 standing. This 
doctrine was formulated for the f irst time in 194S, in chapter VI of the 
Havana Charter, was elaborated, in broader conceptual terms in the 
recommendations contained in. annex A. 11,1 of the Final Act of the f i rs t ., 
session of UNCTAD, and i t has been repeated in many other declarations 
or recommendations of an international or regional character, 
1 6 
2 / For the sake of brevity, the expression "Development Strategy" will 
be used to refer to General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV) on. the 





Despite the unanimity with which this recommendation has been 
reiterated, experience of negotiating international commodity agreements 
has not been encouraging: in the last twenty years only four products 
of interest to the developing countries (sugar, coffee, t in and, to a 
certain extent, wheat) have been the subject of international agreements, 
and the attempts to negotiate a cocoa agreement over the last twelve years 
have borne no fruit . This appears to show that the number of commodities 
on which agreements can be negotiated is very limited, either because of 
the characteristics of the commodity concerned, or because of diff iculties 
in reaching agreement on terms that would be satisfactory to al l the 
interested parties, as was the case with cocoa» 
Without considering for the moment whether or not agreement can be 
reached on other consnodities, there are other reasons for not being too 
hopeful about the prospects of these instruments effectively helping the 
developing countries to increase their export earnings by expanding sales 
of their products at remunerative prices» In the last analysis, this 
is the real objective of the agreements, which they must f u l f i l i f their 
scope is not to be limited to dealing with emergency situations provoked 
by temporary imbalances on the. international market (which have lasted 
for several years in the case of some products). This would be a step 
backwards to the narrow conception of the function of such agreements 
originally embodied in the Havana Charter, which had been superseded by 
the principles and objectives incorporated in the recommendations adopted 
at the f i r s t session of UNCTAD. This contention seems to be borne out 
by certain situations to which the operation of the Wheat and Coffee 
Agreements has given rise; these situations would seem to show, moreover, 
that certain countries subordinate their participation in the agreements 
to their individual interests, and pay l i t t l e attention to the principles 
of international economic co-operation which are an essential aspect 
of those agreements. 
Indeed, the Wheat Agreement could not achieve its objective of keeping 
international prices steady at the minimum levels established in the 
agreement because some of the major exporting countries initiated an 




market. The international wheat market in recent years has been 
characterized by a falling o f f of world demand and increased production 
in some areas. As a result, the stocks held by the exporting countries, 
which had reached their lowest level at the end of the 1965/1966 crop • 
year, began to climb again in subsequent years, making competition for 
export markets more acute. This caused several exporting countries to 
sell below the minimum prices established in the Agreement, which provoked 
a series of mutual accusations of flagrant violation of the commitments 
undertaken by the signatory countries. 
There are several problems in respect of the Coffee Agreement, In 
the f i rst place, there is the problem of deciding on annual export quotas, 
which leads exporters to f i x such quotas at levels compatible with estimates 
of world consumption, in order to protect prices or prevent them front 
falling, while importers try to f i x them at the highest possible level, 
in order to obtain low prices or prevent prices from rising. Although 
this is an unavoidable problem in any agreement based on export quotas, 
i t should be mentioned that i t recently gave rise to serious concern for 
the future of the Coffee Agreement, The worsening of the diff iculties 
was due, in part, to the rise in prices which began in the second half 
of 1969 and was caused by the damage inflicted on the Brazilian crop by 
severe frosts in the areas of production. This f irst upward movement in 
prices after the continuous decline that took place between 1964 and the 
f irst half of 1969, prompted the importing countries to propose a 
considerable increase in quotas, which to a l l intents and purposes robbed 
the Agreement of any effectiveness i t may have had as a mechanism of 
market control. The exporting countries were prepared to accept a slight 
increase in the quotas, but put forward the view that the International 
Coffee Council set up to administer the Agreement should retain ful l 
powers to continue making the necessary adjustments in quotas according 
to the trend of prices, especially in view of the selective nature of 




different types of co f fee .^ Although these differences were finally 
ironed out, the heat that they generated served to underline the fact 
that some of the major importing countries have a very biased attitude: 
they find the Agreement is useful as, long as prices are kept low or 
further reduced (prices f e l l during nearly five of the six years for 
which the Agreement has been in force), but they have no use for i t when 
prices are rising. 
The second problem concerns exports of soluble coffee from Brazil». 
This country's exports of soluble coffee increased considerably from 
1966 onwards, although they continued to represent a very small proportion 
of its total exports of coffee beans, and the United States required a 
heavy tax to be imposed on such exports, most of which were directed to 
its shores. Although these differences were not resolved definitively, 
an agreement was signed between the two Governments whereby Brazil 
undertook to impose, as from May 1969* a duty of 13 dollar cents per 
pound on direct or indirect exports of soluble coffee to the United States* 
The two countries also agreed again to discuss the possibility of adopting 
new measures early in 1970, although the United States reserved the right 
to impose an import duty of 30 dollar cents per pound on soluble coffee, 
Uj According to the established procedure, an init ial quota is fixed 
(before the beginning of the commercial year), and in the course 
of that year any adjustments that are considered advisable in the 
light of market trends are introduced. The volumes of init ial and 
final quotas in recent years have been as follows (in millions of 
60 kg sacks): 
Initial quota Final quota 
1967/1968 47»7 49.7 
1968/1969 47.9 48.5 
1969/1970 46.0 52.0 
1970/1971 54*0 56.8 a/ 
/ a/ Quota in force at 30 November 1970« 
/ i n this 
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5/ in the event of not reaching a satisfactory agreement with Brazil.^ 
According to available information, the latter situation did not arise, 
despite the fact that discussions held in the course of 1970 have not 
6/ 
altered the bases of the above agreement.— 
The problem of the United States1 attitude to exports of soluble 
coffee from Brazil may be considered from several angles, two of which 
are of special interest from the point of view of this document. One 
concerns the proportion of imports of soluble coffee in the total coffee 
imports of the United States; the other relates to the treatment that 
the developed countries (including the United States) have undertaken 
to apply in favour of exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures from 
the developing countries« 
As regards the f irst point, i t should be mentioned that the volume 
of imports of soluble coffee to the United States is a relatively small 
proportion of that country's total coffee imports, viz, 1,8 per cent in 1968 
and 3« 5 per cent in 1 9 6 9 ^ Even taking the percentage relationship between 
5/ This agreement was the result of the arbitral procedure provided for 
in article 44 of the Coffee Agreement, The text may be consulted in 
G. Gordon Patton, Complete Coffee Coverage, New York, 1 May 1969. 
6/ However, when the ratification of the Coffee Agreement was discussed 
in the United States Congress, mention was made of the problem of 
imports of soluble coffee as one of the reasons for approving United 
States1 participation in the Agreement for nine months only, that i s , 
up to July 1970, 
7/ The following table shows United States1 total imports of coffee and 
imports of coffee from Brazil, distributed between coffee beans and 
soluble coffee (the latter in terms of coffee beans), in million of 
60 kg sacks: 
1968 Percentage 1969 Percentage 
c Total imports: 25 857 100.Ö 20 962 100,0 
Coffee beans 25 379 98,2 20 233 96,5 
Soluble coffee 478 1,8 730 3.5 
Imports from Brazil: 
Total: a/ 8 746 33.8 6 419 30*6 
Coffee beans a/ 8 318 32.8 5 779 28.6 
Soluble coffee a/ 428 89,5 640 87.7 
Source: Pan American Coffee Bureau, 1969 Annual Coffee Statistics, 
N° 33, New York, 




imports of soluble coffee and production of that type of coffee in the United 
States (in which case the percentage is higher ) , i t should be considered whether 
such imports really constitute such^an unsettling influence on the market 
as to justify the adoption of so severe a restriction as the duty of 
30 dollar cents per pound, as is asserted by the United States in the 
above-mentioned agreement with Brazil* 
As regards the second point of interest, the attitude adopted by 
the United States is a flagrant violation of the principles and .t.^., 
recommendations approved by that country, in respect of exports of 
manufactures from the developing countries, both in the international 
and the inter-American spheres» Among those recommendations, mention 
may be made of the following: 
"Industrialized countries should also prepare urgently a schedule 
for the reduction and elimination of tar i f f barriers to exports of 
semi-processed and processed products from less-developed countries, 
providing for a reduction of at least 50 per cent of the present 
duties over the next three years»"8/ 
"The rapid expansion of the economies of the less-developed contracting 
parties will be facilitated by a diversification of the structure 
of their economies and the avoidance of an excessive dependence on 
the export ©f primary products. There i s , therefore, need for 
increased access in the largest possible measure to markets under 
favourable conditions for processed and manufactured products 
currently or potentially of particular export interest to less-
developed contracting parties,"9/ 
"The developed contracting parties shall to the fullest extent 
possible , , , give effect to the following provisions: (a) accord high 
priority to the reduction and elimination of barriers to products 
currently or potentially ©f particular export interest to less-
developed contracting parties, including customs duties and other 
restrictions which differentiate unreasonably between such products 
in their primary and in their processed forms; (b) refrain from 
introducing, or increasing the incidence o f , customs duties or non-
tari f f import barriers on products currently or potentially of 
particular export interest to less-developed contracting parties»"10/ 
8/ Ministerial Meeting, May 1963, conclusions and resolutions adopted, 
GATT-, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Twelfth Supplement, 
Geneva, June 1964* p. 37« 
2 / Article XXXVI, paragraph 5> of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, ibid. , vol, IV, p, 54. 
10/ Article XXXVII, paragraph 1, of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 




"Developed countries should not, ordinarily, raise existing tar i f f 
or non-tariff barriers to exports from developing countries, nor 
establish new tar i f f s or non-tariff barriers or any discriminatory 
measures, where such action would have the e f fect of rendering less 
favourable the conditions of access into their markets of manufactured 
and semimanufactured products of export interest to developing 
countries , . . " 1 1 / 
RTo ensure compliance with international commitments to refrain from 
introducing or increasing tar i f f and non-tariff barriers that affect 
exports of the developing countries, taking into account the interests 
of Latin America»"12/ 
"The Member States, recognizing the close interdependence between 
foreign trade and economic and social development, should make 
individual and united efforts to bring about: (a) Reduction or 
elimination, by importing countries, of tar i f f and non-tariff barriers 
that affect the exports of the Members of the Organization . . . J 
(b) Maintenance of continuity in their economic and social development 
by means o f : ( i i i ) Diversification of exports and expansion of 
export opportunities for manufactured and semi-manufactured products 
from the developing countries •«•"¿2/ 
In the light of the documents quoted above, i t seems evident that 
any action by the United States to impose duties or other restrictions 
on imports of soluble coffee from the developing countries would run 
counter to both i ts pol i t ical and i ts legal commitments. 
The operation of the International Coffee Agreement i s running into 
another problem that may be of even broader scope in the sense that i t 
may affect the whole policy of commodity agreements. This is connected 
with a report to the United States Congress by the Comptroller-General 
which states, on the one hand, that United States participation in the 
11/ Proceedings of the United Nations Conference oh Trade and Development: 
Final Act and Report (United Nations publication. Sales 64.II.B.11), 
Annex A. 111*4, paragraph 9, p. 38. 
12/ Declaration of the Presidents of America in Organization of American 
States, Meeting of American Chiefs of State (0EA/Ser.C/lX,l) 
(Washington, D.C., Pan American Union, 1967), chapter I I I , paragraph 5* 
p. 70. • 
13/ Article 37 of the Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the 
Organization of American States, "Protocol of Buenos Aires" 




Coffee Agreement entails a transfer of resources on concessional terms 
and, on the other, that this transfer of resources is not subject to 
the terms and conditions covering the financial assistance supplied 
under appropriations in the f i scal budget. According to the Comptroller-
General's report, the operations of the International Coffee Agreement 
and the establishment of import quotas for sugar are a means of transferring 
resources, since they enable sugar and coffee exporting countries to 
obtain greater earnings than they would have received otherwise: 
"Sugar and coffee assistance qualify as foreign aid because they 
entail a transfer resources from the United States to other countries 
on concessional terms. In the case of sugar, foreign quota holders 
are able-to sel l sugar in United States markets at prices generally 
substantially above world prices. In the case of cof fee, exporting 
countries sel l at prices which are above those likely to have prevailed 
in the absence of the International Coffee Agreement. Since demand 
for both commodities is inelastic, earnings of foreign sugar quota 
holders and coffee-exporting countries are higher than they would 
otherwise have been. Resources are therefore transferred from 
American consumers to countries selling sugar and coffee in 
United States markets."li/ 
The implications of this argument regarding sugar and coffee are 
vast and must be considered in some detail. First, the argument tends 
to undermine one of the fundamental aims of international commodity 
arrangements that has been accepted and supported by the United States 
in various recommendations adopted at the international and inter-
American levels»-^/ The raison d'etre of commodity arrangements Is that, 
14/ Comptroller-General of the United States, Report to the Congress: 
Foreign Aid Provided Through the Operations of the United States Sugar 
Act and the International Coffee Agreement (23 October 1969) (excerpts 
from the report relating to the International Coffee Agreement were 
reprinted in toter-American Economic Affairs, vol. 23, N° 3> winter 1969)» 
15/ In the recommendation contained in annex A. 11*1 adopted at the f i rst 
session of UNCTAD, i t is stated that: "A basic objective of international 
commodity arrangements in general is to stimulate a dynamic and steady 
growth and ensure reasonable predictability in the real export earnings 
of developing countries, so as to provide them with expanding resources 
for their economic and social development, while taking into account 
the interests of consumers in importing countries". Paragraph 6 of 
chapter III of the Declaration of the Presidents of America states: "To 
combine efforts to strengthen and perfect existing international 
agreements, particularly the International Coffee Agreement, to obtain 
favourable conditions for trade in basic products of interest to Latin 
America and to explore a l l possibilities for the development of new 
agreements", 
/ t o a 
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to a greater or lesser extent they can guarantee the developing countries 
a level of export earnings that they would not achieve i f their commodity 
exports were entirely at the mercy of the free play of the market forfces. 
Secondly, the argument confirms a by now traditional inconsistency 
in United States policy regarding commodity agreements. The United States 
has participated as an exporter in the various arrangements negotiated 
on wheat, since 1949, which have always contained clauses on floor and 
ceiling prices, and multilateral purchase-sale commitments i . e . , regulations 
that tend to replace completely or partially the free play ©f market 
forces. It is not easy to understand why what is good for the United States 
as an exporter is not good for i t as an importer, but what i s certain 
is that the attitude of the United States to arrangements on commodities 
that i t imports has generally been negative, as is shown by the fact that 
i t has not participated in the various agreements on tin and by the way 
i t has held up negotiations on the cocoa agreement. 
Thirdly, the argument ignores the large number of recommendations 
approved with the supporting vote of the United States in international 
and inter-American bodies regarding remunerative prices for the exports 
of the developing countries. In actual fact, the policy of remunerative 
prices is an essential element of United States agricultural policy 
through the system of parity prices and measures to support domestic prices 
that cover, among many other products, the sugar produced in the 
United States. If a minimum price level is considered remunerative for, 
domestic sugar producers in the United States, there is no reason for 
considering that the remunerative price for producers outside the 
United States should be half or less than half the.price set for domestic 
producers. 
It is superfluous to delve any deeper into the inconsistency of the 
position advanced in the Comptroller-General^ report, which is in fact 
a retrograde step as regards a l l the principles and objectives of 
international economic co-operation that have been so painstakingly worked 
out over the past two decades. But i t is appropriate to consider some 
of the consequences of the argument that both the operation of the 




a concessional element that should be considered part of United States 
financial aid to the developing countries. The Comptroller-General's 
report notes that it is di f f icult to determine how the market might 
have developed in the absence af the United States Sugar Act and the 
International Coffee Agreement, and therefore to determine what the 
basis for assessing the volume of financial assistance should be. 
/ 
Nevertheless, i t contains a projection of the trends of world production, 
exports and prices before the International Coffee Agreement came into 
force, giving ^orders of magnitude" of the total amount of foreign aid 
( i . e « , the difference between the actual earnings and the estimated 
earnings of the exporters in the absence of the Agreement), This involves, 
of course, in addition to the margin of error implicit in the assumptions 
on which the projections are based, abandoning a l l ideas of remunerative 
prices. Since the developing countries are not in a position to choose 
between exporting at a given f loor price and not exporting at a l l , what 
happens is that they continue to export even when price levèls f a l l Tbelow 
what may be considered remunerative. In this case, there is a transfer 
of resources from the developing to the developed countries. Past-
experience clearly shows that prices have been low for much longer periods 
than they have been high, or, to put i t another way, the developing 
countries have transferred more resources to the developed countries 
than vice versa. 
Basically, the argument advanced in the Comptroller-General's report 
is designed to make the operation of commodity agreements subject to tho 
same principles that govern the granting of financial assistance, for 
i t states that: 
"Commodity trade assistance is subject only to limited congressional 
review and control. While traditional aid is reviewed annually by 
the Congress as part of the foreign aid authorization and appropriation 
process, congressional review of commodity trade is undertaken 
infrequently..• Commodity trade assistance is made available 
independently of considerations of comparative self-help, performance 
and balance of payments requirements of the less developed countries 
receiving such assistance relative to each other and to the countries 
which do not receive-such assistance»., Commodity trade assistance 
is not tied to United States exports. In contrast, procurement under 
development loans and grants is tied to United States exports and 




of normal commercial purchases of agricultural commodities,.. 
Commodity trade assistance is- in: effect financed regressively 
through higher prices for American consumers, rather than being 
financed out of general Federal revenues which are more progressive 
in their incidence..."16/ 
It should be noted however, that in the, allocation of sugar quotas 
some of the conditions and restrictions mentioned in this, report are 
already being applied. When the United States Sugar Act was. adopted 
in 1965, the quotas for foreign producers were worked out on the basis, 
inter alia, of the following factors: 
(a) Stability of supply of the country allocated the quota* including 
the element of stability of the local .government; 
(b) The economic need of the country and the relative value of a 
quota to i t j , ^ 
. (c) Purchase o f , and potential market for , United States agricultural 
commodities, including the balance of trade relationship with 
the United Statesj 
(d) Reasons of national policy and strategy, including unusual 
military or strategic importance of the nation.receiving the 
quotaj 
(e) Friendliness of the government and support of United States 
foreign policy,, particularly in the United Nations and the 
Organization of American States.^-/ 
In addition, the Sugar Act gave the Government wide-ranging powers 
tp cancel the sugar quota of any country for reasons of,national interest 
or i f a country expropriated the property of United States citizens 
without adequate compensation. 
Applying these same criteria to the operation of the Coffee Agreement 
or any other commodity agreement would be a complete negation of the objectives 
of the agreements, and in the final analysis would automatically reduce 
s t i l l further the already limited prospects for negotiating such agreements. 
16/ Comptroller-General of the United States, op.cit . 
17/ Se© The developiient of foreign sugar quotas in H.Ro 11135* Committee 
on Agriculture, House of Representatives (U.S. Government Printing 




Experience over the past decade leads inevitably to the conclusion 
that there are relatively poor prospects for international commodity 
agreements becoming effective instrument for organizing the world commodity 
market in a way that would ensure greater earnings for the exporting 
developing countries. On the cone hand, for various reasons, there are 
very few commodities on which agreements have been or could be negotiated; 
on the other, the operation of the few commodity agreements that do exist, 
is hampered by conflicts of interest between exporting and importing 
countries and also at times by conflicts of interest between exporting 
developing countries themselves»^/ In order to overcome the growing 
dif f iculties involved in the negotiation and operation of these agreements, 
there must be a change in the purely fprmalistic way in which many countries 
participate in them and there must be machinery to subordinate ehort-term 
convenience to the longer term objectives inherent in this sphere of 
international economic co-operation. Perhaps the negotiation of a general 
agreement ^n commodity arrangements (in accordance with the recommendation 
in annex A.II . l of the Final Act of the f irst session of UNCTAD) might 
solve some of the problems the arrangements have run into, but most of 
the developed countries and some of the developing countries have not 
shown much willingness to continue studies and consultations with this 
end in view. 
18/ It may be said that the fact that the exporting developing countries 
do not present a solid front i s generally one of the greatest weaknesses 
of commodity arrangements. An exception to this, however, is the 
experience of the countries members of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC).. Although OPEC does not have the features 
of a formal agreement, such as the coffee, sugar and tin agreements, 
the members recently implemented a number of measures affecting the 
petroleum producing companies operating in their territories designed 
to improve price levels and increase the share of revenue received 
by the respective Governments. A news cable on these measures noted 
that: "The surrender of the western o i l companies to the demands of 
the oil-producing Persian Gulf countries is a dramatic demonstration 
of the power that an efficiente cartel of commodity producers is 
capable of exercising over the highly industrialized nations of 
western Europe and Japan, and over the international o i l companies 
that formerly controlled the world o i l market". See El Mercurio, 
Santiago, Chile, 17 February 1971« 
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2« Buffer stocks 
The establishment and operation o f buffer stocks, or international 
stabilization reserves, is one of the specific measures adopted in commodity 
arrangements and may or may not be accompanied by other controls for 
facilitating or increasing their effectiveness. The recommendation in 
annex A.II . l of the Final Act of the f irst session of UNCTAD lists buffer 
stocks as one of several stabilizing techniques that may be incorporated 
in commodity agreements and, at the same time, states that they should 
be financed by exporting countries or jointly by importing and exporting 
countries. Although, in the preliminary negotiations for a cocoa agreement, 
a consensus was reached on how to operate a buffer stock as an integral 
part of the agreement, no buffer stocks have in fact been set up since 
the recommendation was approved; they have therefore tended to play a 
much smaller role than commodity agreements in stabilizing world markets, 
since the only one that has so far been established is that operating 
under the International Tin Agreement. 
This can partly be explained by the stricter requirements that must 
be met by each commodity as regards international classification, storage 
risk of deterioration, market structure, etc. A l is t of commodities of 
which buffer stocks might be established could include coffee, cocoa, Sugar, 
natural rubber, jute, hard fibres, copper, lead, zinc, tungsten arid 
manganese ore, but this l i s t is not exhaustive.^^ The most serious 
di f f icult ies , however, have centred on two major problems: definition of 
operating norms and principles, and financing. Both were discussed at 
length at the second session of UNCTAD, since when a number of agreements 
have been reached as to how these obstacles could be smoothed over. 
As regards operating norms and principles, i t was decided that 
whenever a commodity agreement established a buffer-stack^ conditions would 
be laid down governing i ts use to regulate the market. This was something 
of a defeat for the developing countries which wanted clear guidelines 
19/ See "The development of an international commodity policy", Proceedings 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Second . 
Session (United Nations publication, Sales N°2 E.68.II*D.15), vol. II , 
p. 26. 
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to be laid down specifying how such stocks were to be used and for what 
purposes; this would have done much to simplify subsequent negotiations 
on individual commodities» As for financing, the decision adopted 
recognizes that a regular source of income was needed for buffer stocks 
to be able to carry out their stabilizing function properly, that such 
income should be provided on an equitable basis by al l the parties 
concerned and that, where necessary, the init ial pre-financing capital 
should come from international financial agencies and other sources 
(private capital, Government loans and grants). In line with this 
decision, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced a system in 
mid-1969 under which each member country could draw up to 50 par cent 
of i ts quotap so as to help countries that needed i t to finance buffer 
20/ 
stocks»—' For i ts part, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development agreed to consider requests for the additional financing 
that countries might need in order to participate in the operation of 
buffer stocks, particularly for the construction of suitable storage 
fac i l i t ies , in accordance with the usual criteria governing the Bank's 
credit policy» 
Though i t i s s t i l l limited inasmuch as i t does not represent a direct 
participation in the financing but a loan to Governments, the contribution 
of the international financing agencies, especially the IMF, towards 
solving the problems of financing buffer stocks will in certain cases 
give developing countries more hope of establishing buffer stocks for 
specific conmodities, provided that the burden of their external debt 
servicing is not too heavy to prevent them from servicing any fresh 
loans they may obtain for buffer stocks. On this point, the Development 
Strategy merely states (paragraph 23): "All possible resources for the 
pre-financing of buffer stocks, when necessary, will be considered while 
concluding or reviewing commodity agreements incorporating buffer stock 
mechanisms". 
20/ The f irst use of this drawing system was approved in November 1970 in 
connexion with the financing of the buffer stock set up under the 
International Tin Agreement» 
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3* Pricing policy 
During the 1950s, several United Nations agencies concentrated 
their attention on the problem of the prices of the commodity exports 
of developing countries, especially on price fluctuations aad the effect 
of these on total export earnings* Though none of the proposals then 
put forward to mitigate the effects of such fluctuations were actually 
adopted, IMF's decision in 1963 to establish a compensatory credit 
system for countries whose export earnings dropped assured developing 
countries of a form of financial assistance that would at least temporarily 
offset the effects of a serious fa l l in the prices of their export 
commodities. However, since, even on the more liberal terms adopted 
in 1967, this compensatory credit does no more than cushion the effects 
©f price instability, the actual problem of price levels and the causes 
of their instability continue to be one of the most vital aspects of 
international trade policy measures from the point of view of developing 
countries. 
Among the recommendations of the f i rst session of UNCTAD, annex 
A.II . l ©f the Final Act listed a set of measures designed to "eecure 
remunerative, equitable and stable prices for primary commodities, especially 
those exported by developing countries, having due regard for the import 
purchasing power of the commodities exported", While stressing the 
importance of international commodity arrangements as the best means of 
achieving this objective, other measures were also recommended, for the 
same purpose, particularly the liberalization of conditions of access to 
the markets of developed countries. The techniques that could be employed 
under commodity arrangements included floor and ceiling prices, quota 
arrangements, long-term purchase and sale arrangements and buffer stock 
schemes - al l of which should contribute in varying degrees to maintaining 
remunerative, equitable and stable prices. / 
Other international agencies, particularly GATT, have adopted similar 
recommendations. The conclusions and resolutions at the GATT Ministerial 
Meeting in May 1963, for instance, urged "that an effort should be 
made to ensure increasing exports at remunerative, equitable and stable 




this respect, any desirable arrangement made at the world level could 
be inspired by arrangements already tried out on a regional, bilateral 
or even national basis"» These principles and objectives were subsequently 
included in the text of the General Agreement (article XXXVI, paragraph 4) : 
"Given the continued dependence of many less-developed contracting parties 
on the exportation of a limited range of primary products, there is need 
to provide in the largest possible measure more favourable and acceptable 
conditions of access to world markets for these products, and wherever, 
appropriate to devise measures designed to stabilize and improve conditions 
of world markets in these products, including in particular measures 
designed to attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices, thus permitting 
an expansion of world trade and demand and a dynamic and steady growth 
of the real export earnings of these countries so as to provide them with 
expanding resources for their economic development". 
These and similar recommendations have not been properly complied 
with, partly because none of them defines what is meant by equitable 
and remunerative prices or establishes criteria for such a definition« 
At the national level, for example, nearly every developed country 
supports or subsidizes agricultural prices so as to guarantee a minimum 
income for the producers by means of prices that are higher than on the 
free market. In the agricultural sector, price-support policies are 
thus aimed at ensuring remunerative, equitable and stable prices for the 
producers and are fixod in terms of a minimum income level. At the 
international level, the problems that would have to be solved in order 
to apply a policy of remunerative prices for producers.in developing 
countries are of course far more complicated, but i t i s commonly thought 
that they are not insuperable. This is the >line taken by the Development 
Strategy which, stressing the need for guaranteed remunerative and stable 
prices with a view to increasing the foreign exchange earnings from exports 
©f primary products from the developing countries, states (paragraph 24)s 
"Efforts will be made to reach agreement, before the third session of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, on a set of general 
principles on pricing policy to serve as guidelines for consultations 




In this sense, the Development Strategy proposed going further than 
the agreement that was reached by the Trade and Development Board after 
lengthy discussions on pricing policy at its ninth and tenth sessions. 
Thus, the Board's resolution 73 (X) does not mention the need to "reach 
agreement . . . on a set of general principles on pricing policy", even 
though i t does state that efforts towards the elimination of excessive 
short-term fluctuations should be actively pursued and that international 
efforts to improve prices, where they stand at a level which is not 
considered remunerative to producers, should be reinforced by appropriate 
national and international measures to alter the underlying supply and 
demand situation. It further points out that the price mechanism 
established in international commodity arrangements should remain in 
force for a sufficiently long period in order to facilitate the defence 
of agreed price-ranges by al l participants, achieve greater predictability 
as to the export earnings of developing countries and promote action-
oriented programmes designed to correct instances of structural 
disequilibrium® 
The conclusion to be drawn from discussions of pricing policy for 
basic commodities seems to be that a policy of this kind would have to 
be worked out in the context of international agreements on individual 
products, which in view of the discouraging experience of negotiating 
commodity arrangements, would severely limit the number of products i*o 
which could be extended. It must therefore be assumed that the application 
of a pricing policy for basic products would mean stepping up efforts 
to sign agreements on new commodities, which in turn would require a 
more flexible approach from both the importing and the exporting countries. 
If a l l , or most, of the countries interested in trade in a specific 
commodity participate in an agreement on i t and there is a system of 
voting by a distributed majority of both importing and exporting members 
on the councils administering the agreement, a l l the important decisions 
involving international trade in the commodity concerned can reconcile 
the interests of both the exporting and the importing countries, including 
decision on a pricing policy. The councils administering the agreements 
are therefore the most suitable instruments not only for establishing a 
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pricing policy for individual commodities but also for carrying out 
that policy in accordance with the regulatory measures laid down in the 
agreement, particularly i f i t involves operating a buffer stock» 
4© Standstill commitment 
The group of measures and policies covered by recommendation A.IIel 
adopted at the f i rst session of UNCTAD includes the standstill provision, 
according to which "no new tari f f or non-tariff barriers should be 
created (or existing barriers increased) by developed countries against 
imports of primary products of particular interest to developing countries"» 
Recommendation A.III.4 embodies a similar commitment: "Developed countries 
should not ordinarily raise existing tari f f or non-tariff barriera to 
exports from developing countries nor establish new tari f f or non-tariff 
barriers or any discriminatory measures, where such action would have 
the effect of rendering less favourable the conditions of access into 
their markets of manufactured and sem-manufactured products of export 
interest to developing countries". Both these recommendations were adopted 
without dissent at the f irst UNCTAD session and they both stipulate that 
developed countries which adopt measures that conflict with these 
recommendations should consult the developing countries affected. 
Prior to the f i rst session of UNCTAD, the Ministerial Meeting of 
GATT, in May 1963, hac adopted a recommendation on the standstill provision 
which was subsequently included in the commitments assumed by the developed 
countries members of GATT under article XXXVII (Part IV) of the General 
Agreement. This article also establishes consultation procedures to 
which any contracting party which considers that the commitments specified 
therein have not been complied with can have recourse. 
In paragraphs (25) and (33) the Development Strategy endorses the 
standstill commitment in practically the same terms as those used in 
recommendations A.II . l and A.III.4 of the f i rst session of UNCTAD, i . e . , the 
distinction between primary products and manufactured and semi-manufactured i 




stringent;—' but no reference is made to the consultation procedures 
for cases in which those corrmitments are violated, and they are thus subject 
solely to the review and appraisal of the progress made towards achieving 
the Development Strategy's objectives. 
As regards the fulfilment of the standstill commitment, i t should be 
noted that although seme developing countries have on occasion expressed 
reservations about certain measures adopted by developed countries which 
would seem to constitute a violation of this conmdtment, as a rule they have 
not invoked the consultation procedures established in article XXXVII of the 
Gensral Agreement for cases where the commitments laid down in this article, 
including the standstill commitment, had not been complied with. The GATT 
Committee on Trade and Development, which is responsible for reviewing and 
undertaking the necessary consultations for the implementation of Part IV of 
the General Agreement (articles XXXVI to XXXVIII), at its twenty-sixth session 
in March 1970 considered i t advisable to define more clearly what procedure 
should be followed in cases where there had not been compliance with the 
provisions of Part IVv To that end i t was agreed that expert or working 
groups could b*» set up - with the consent of the interested parties - to 
examine the question and hold the relevant consultations; a report on the 
results of their work would be presented to the Committee on Trade and 
Development within the ensuing six months. This procedure would, of course, 
be open to the countries members of GATT but not to countries that were not 
members (twelve of the twenty Latin American States), which would have to 
follow the system of consultations envisaged in the UNCTAD recommendations; 
this has not been invoked either in cases of presumed v io lat ion .^ ' 
21/ While in regard to primary products the recommendation reads "no new 
tar i f f and non-tariff barriers will be raised.,, by developed 
countries,, ." , in regard to manufactured and semi-manufactured products 
i t reads "developed countries will not, ordinarily, raise existing 
tari f f or non-tariff barriers• 
22/ As regards trade relations between the United States and the Latin 
„ American countries, the establishment of the Special Conanittee for 
Consultation and Negotiation of the Inter-American Economic and Social 
Council (IA-ECOSOC) has provided the machinery for undertaking the 
necessary consultations and negotiations to solve trade problems 




5o Liberalization of trade arid access to markets 
With respect to trade liberalization and the improvement of 
conditions of access to the developed countries1 markets.for products 
of export interest to developing countries, the Development Strategy-
suggests that inter«governmental consultations aid the efforts to obtain 
important results before 31 December 1972 be continued and intensified« 
In this as in other f ields, the policy measures envisaged in the 
Development Strategy are an endorsement of the recommendations and 
resolutions which were adopted at the f i rst session of UNCTAD and at 
the Ministerial Meeting of GATT held in May 1963,, and were subsequently 
embodied as commitments of the developed contracting parties in Part IV of 
the General Agreement, The intention expressed in the resolutions of 
the f i rs t session of UNCTAD and of the Ministerial Meeting of GATT was 
to achieve results before the end of 1965, or not later than the end of 
the First Development Decade, a goal which i t was not possible to achieve* 
The Kennedy Round undoubtedly offered the best opportunity of. 
granting concessions in favour of exports from developing countries, but 
i t is well known that the results of these negotiations centred mainly on 
manufactured products involved in reciprocal trade between the developed 
23/ 
a r e a s F u r t h e r m o r e , subsequent investigations have shown that the 
tari f f concessions accorded to some products of interest to developing 
countries may not be so favourable as appears at f i rst sight i f as a 
result the effective protection enjoyed by manufactures or. semi-manufactures 
in the developed countries' markets i s increased» In fact, to the extent 
that tari f f reductions for a primary product were greater than those 
made for the same product at different stages of processing, the protection 
1 for the component comprising the value added in processing would be 
23/ For an analysis of the results of these negotiations, see 
The Kennedy Round Estimated-Effects on Tariff Barriers 




greater ,^ ' The result would therefore be that when they secured more 
liberal conditions of access for their exports of primary products, the 
developing countries would encounter even greater dif f icult ies in exporting 
these same products in processed or manufactured form« 
In this respect, the Development Strategy quite rightly indicates 
that the efforts to liberalize the conditions of access to markets for 
primary products from developing countries should apply also to processed 
and semi-processed products and should cover both custp&s tar i f fs and 
non-tariff restrictions. This recommendation, however, like a l l those 
24/ See the study by Professor Bela Balassa entitled "The effects of the 
Kennedy Round on thè exports of processed goods from developing 
countries" (UNCTAD, TD/69), 15 February 1968, and the report by the 
UNCTAD secretariat entitled 11 Increases in tari f f differentials between 
raw materials, serai-manufactures and manufactures at different stages 
of processing resulting from the Kennedy Round of Tariff Reductions" 
(TD/B/C,2/92), 21 November 1969, Some examples taken from the latter 
document illustrate the situation: 
Tariff ' Tariff differential 
Country BTN item Pre- Poat- Pre- Post-
- Kennedy Kennedy Kennedy Kennedy 
Japan ex 09#CEE Coffee beans, 
unroasfced 30 % Free 
ex 21,02 Instant coffee 
(soluble) 25 % 25% - 5 * 25 % 
United ex 55»01 Cotton, bleached or 
Kingdom dyed 10 % 5 % -
ex 55.09 Cotton fabrics not 
containing silk or man-made 
fibres 17.5 % 17.5 % 7.5 % 12.5 5 
United Chamois leather, oil-tanned 15 % 7.5 % 
States Leather footwear for4 men and • 
boys 10 % S.5 % ~5% 
EEC ex 44,05 Tropical wood sawn 
lengthwise 10 % Free 
ex 44ol5 Plywood, other than 




adopted previously on the same subject, is too general in scope and 
therefore fail© to establish any rule or programme through which i t could 
be gradually put into practice. Clearly, such a programme could be 
prepared in the initial stages of the inter-governmental consultations; 
some products or groups of products could be selected, the percentage 
tari f f reductions for each could be established beforehand, and the 
reduction could be made over the space of a few years, or in any other 
way that would guarantee similar results, for both tari f f reductions and 
gradual elimination of non-tariff restrictions® 
It does not seem to be going too far to say that the lack of a 
specific programme for facilitating access t o developed countries1 markets 
largely explains why the progress that has been made in this direction 
has been so slow and so meagre. For example, in relation to the 
fulfilment of commitments assumed by the developed contracting parties 
in accordance with article XXXVII (Part IV) of GATT, the procedure 
hitherto followed has been for the developed countries to notify GATT of 
the liberalization measures they have adopted. Under this system^ a 
developed- country which reduces the duties on a given product from 25 to 
24 per cent considers that i t i s complying with the commitment to lower 
tari f f barriers, even i f the product is of l i t t l e or no significance in 
the developing countries1 exports. In a case like this, however, could i t 
really be said that the developed country has accorded high priority to 
the reduction and elimination of barriers or that the reduction has been 
made to the fullest extent possible, as provided in article XXXVII? 
It is clear, therefore," that the question of liberalizing conditions 
of access to markets for exports from developing countries must be 
approached in terms of more clearly defined bases, principles and measures 
than those of a somewhat general nature contained in the recommendations 
previously adopted» It must be recognized that in recent years some 
progress has been made in the study of this question, particularly in 
UNCTAD and GATT, through the preparation and compilation of adequate 
data on the type of tari f f and non-tariff barriers to selected groups 




pursued by developed countries with respect to those products. Thus,, 
the bases are being laid for the subsequent preparation of specific 
programmes for liberalizing trade and access to markets» Part of the 
work that has been done in this* f ield relates to the following questions: 
(a) Non~tariff barrrleg s^ 
The GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products prepared a 
consolidated l i s t of non-tariff barriers on the basis of .800 notifications 
made by i ts member countries, which were classified in five groups: 
( i ) Stated-operated trade; ( i i ) customs and administrative import formalitiesj 
( i i i ) rules applicable to imported and domestically produced products; 
( iv) quantitative restrictions and other similar measures; and (v) import 
and export restrictions through price mechanisms* A preliminary examination 
of these notifications revealed that they constituted examples of general 
and multilateral problems concerning which either there were no proper 
international, regulations or those in force were interpreted differently 
by the various countries or were not wholly enforced; others related to 
measures which were considered by one or more countries to conflict with 
existing commitments. The Committee decided to prepare a limited indicative 
l i s t of the barriers reported and to establish five working groups to 
explore the possibilities of specific action aimed at reducing or 
eliminating the barriers or preparing possible rules of procedure in 
the matter* The indicative l i s t that has been prepared include® about 
thirty different types of non-tariff barriers» 
The task entrusted to the workihg groups represents a highly positive 
step in an area to which due attention has not so far been paid. In fact, 
as progress has been made in reducing tar i f f barriers (particularly through 
the five rounds of tari f f negotiations in GATT), non-tariff barriers have 
assumed more importance, especially those consisting in discretionary 
administrative regulations or regulations adopted improperly under the 
protection of rules governing mixtures, packing and labeling, or Industrial; 
health; and safety regulations» Some of these barriers could be reduced or 
eliminated through:the adoption of more precise and detailed international 
regulations, or through understandings regarding their scope and 




established for consultation and negotiation between the interested 
parties. In any case, i t should be recognized that the work which has 
been initiated may well culminate in achieving compliance .with the 
recommendations on the elimination of non-tariff barriers. 
(b) Tariff barriers s t i l l in force after the Kennedy Round 
Concurrently with the study of non-tariff barriers, the GATT Committee 
on Trade in Industrial Products started to prepare a comparative analysis 
of the tari f f situation that would exist once a l l the concessions agreed 
upon during the Kennedy Round had been applied. The purpose of this 
analysis was to show the degree of tar i f f protection that s t i l l exists 
by calculating the general average tar i f f rates for categories or groups 
and subgroups of products. This work - which was entrusted to an Expert Group-
and that of the five working groups .on non-tariff barriers mentioned above, 
will enable the Committee on Trade in Industrial Products to f u l f i l carry 
out i ts mandate in the sense of exploring every possibility of making new 
progress in the liberalization of international trade. 
(c) Special problems affecting agricultural products 
The progress made towards liberalizing trade in manufactured 
products (which mainly benefits the developed areas) contrasts sharply 
with the l i t t l e that has been achieved in connexion with trade in 
agricultural products, which are the most important items in developing 
countries. In view of the failure in the Kennedy Round to agroe on 
concessions for agricultural products, the countries members of GATT decided 
to set. up an Agriculture Committee "to examine the problems in the agricultural 
sector, and to explore the opportunities for making progress in the 
attainment of the objectives of the General Agreement in the agricultural 
f ie ld . The examination would cover a l l agricultural products important 
in international trade. This examination should prepare the way for 
subsequent consideration of positive solutions which could be mutually 
accepted by a l l contracting parties concerned. It would bear on all. 
25/ relevant elements of agricultural trade and production policies"»—1 
25/ GATT, Basic Instruments and"Selected Documents« Fifteenth Supplement 




In the f irst stage of i ts work, the Agricultural Committee selected , 
eight important products (grains, beef and other meat and meat preparations, 
1 
fruit and. vegetables, dairy products, oilseeds and vegetable o i ls , tobacco 
and wine), and decided to examine the problems affecting tnem under two main 
headings: ( i ) structure of international markets, in order to ascertain the 
trends in prices, quantities traded and the importance of free and 
regulated markets and non-commercial transactions; and ( i i ) the motivations 
and general orientation of production policies. The Committee set up four 
working groups to study specific questions: Group 1, the measures that 
affect exports (subsidies, refunds, dual price systems, subsidised credit, 
non-commercial transactions and other forms of government aid to exports); 
Group 2, import measures (quantitative restrictions, prohibitions, licence 
systems, discriminatory practices, tari f f quotas, customs duties and 
compensatory charges); Group 3, production policies (price support systems, 
rates of self-supply); Group 4, health regulations and other questions 
not specifically dealt with by the other groups. Although the activities 
of the working groups are s t i l l in their preliminary stages, some objectives 
have already been established and priority will be given to studying them, 
including the elimination of government assistance to exports, the 
elimination of discriminatory practices, the establishment of self-supply 
ceilings, the adoption of price support policies that will not affoot 
production, and the application of health regulations in conformity with 
internationally established non-discriminatory rules, 
(d) Tropical products 
The work entrusted to the Agriculture Committee mainly concerns those 
products in which exports from*developing countries compete with the 
developed countries1 own production. As indicated above, the l i s t of 
selected products prepared by this Committee includes items which are 
produced by both developed and developing countries. Tropical.products 
do not normal 1 y compete with production by developed countries, in spite 
of which they are subject in many countries to import duties and high 
f iscal charges on consumption. The elimination of these duties and charges 




UNCTAD, which have not yet, hoover, been fully implemented* Thus, in 
the Action Programme for the promotion of international trade adopted at 
the GATT Ministerial Meeting of November 1961, i t was agreed to eliminate 
or considerably reduce f iscal charges whether customs duties or internal 
taxes, and this resolution was endorsed in the conclusions and resolutions 
adopted at the Ministerial Meeting held in May 1963, where i t was expressly 
decided that duty-free entry into the industrialized countries should be 
granted to tropical products by 31 December 1963« The recommendation in 
annex A.II . l adopted at the f irst session of UNCTAD and in article XXXVIII 
(Part 17) of the' General Agreement confirmed the commitment to reduce or 
eliminate customs duties and internal charges on tropical products, whose, 
duty-free entry was discussed, in the Kennedy Round, also with no results. 
It must be clearly understood, however, that although some progress has 
been made in the reduction of customs duties on some of these products, 
nothing has.been done towards reducing or-eliminating fiscal charges on 
consumption« 
In recognition of this situation, GATT, at i ts twenty-fourth session 
in November 1967, agreed to reactivate the Special Group on Tropical. 
Products with the following terms of reference: to examine problems 
affecting trade in tropical products and to report on ways and means of 
overcoming those problems, with particular attention to the study of the 
incidence of f iscal charges and internal taxes». This Special Group agreed 
to give priority to the study of the situation of coffee, cocoa, bananas, 
tea, oilseeds and vegetable o i ls , and spices, to which rubber was added 
later,, At the same time, i t was decided that the problems to be examined 
would bear on customs duties, f iscal charges, systems of general preferences, 
competition from synthetic products and substitutes, and price and market 
instability. However, although the Special,Group has made some progress 
in identifying and examining these problems, i t has s t i l l not reached the stage 
of formulating specific recommendations on ways of solving them. 
The adoption of measures to liberalize trade in tropical products 
i s of great importance to Latin America because these products account for 




are probably the high f iscal charges or internal taxes on consumption 
which are s t i l l levied in several European countries, and the discrimination 
against Latin American exports owing to the systems of special preferences 
maintained by EEC and the United Kingdom. As regards the f irst problem, 
i t has sometimes been suggested that, until such time as decisions are 
adopted regarding the substantial reduction or elimination of internal 
taxes, the developed countries which apply those taxes might consider 
refunding their value to the exporting countries« With regard to the 
second point, not only has no attempt been made to seek adequate solutions, 
but the agreement between EEC and some African States according the latter 
free access to that market have been renewed for a further five.years, thus 
discriminating against import's from Latin America. In addition, the 
possible expansion of EEC through the entry of the United Kingdom and 
other European countries would also mean an intensification of the 
discriminatory policy against Latin American exports, inasmuch as the 
new members would have to adopt the common external tari f f and also grant 
free access to the EEC associated States, 
(e) Residual restrictions 
Lastly, the GATT Committee on Trade and.Development also agreed to 
reactivate the Group on Residual Restrictions, i . e . , a l l those banders 
which are inconsistent with the General Agreement and in respect.of which 
no waiver has been obtained for their application or maintenance. To that 
e f fect , the Group conducted a far-reaching discussion on the nature of the 
existing residual barriers and laid down some rules to improve the 
procedures for reporting them, particularly in connexion with products of 
export interest to developing countries. Adopting a procedure similar to 
that followed in the study of other issues related to the liberalization 
of trade and access.to markets, the Group decided to select a limited l i s t 
of products - honey, cut flowers, potatoes, tomatoes, onions, citrus fruit 
and juices, apples, pears, peaches, molasses, wine, ethyl alcohol,, fish 




thread, fabrics and articles of fibres other than cotton, carpets 
and material of coconut f ibre, and leather footwear. It.requested 
the preparation of statistical information on production, imports 
and consumption of these products in the developed countries, to be 
supplemented by information supplied by those same countries about 
any dif f icult ies there might be in removing the barriers s t i l l in 
force. 
This summary of recent trade liberalization activities shows 
that more attention is now being paid to the problems affecting the 
developing countries1 trade. The preparation of limited l ists of 
products to which priority will be given in the examination of problems 
and in the consideration and discussion of measures to solve them may 
be a way of obtaining satisfactory results in the not too distant future, 
particularly in the agricultural products sector, where general 
commitments have thus far proved to be of l i t t l e value. It should,, 
however, be noted that the effectiveness of the trade liberalization 
measures adopted is also largely dependent on the use that i s made of 
escape or safeguard clauses. None of the committees or working groups 
set up to examine specific trade liberalization problems are considering 
ths modes and forms of application of escape clauses, and i t would be 
nscessary to establish really effective notification and consultation 
procedures in order to restrict their use to exceptional situations and 
to short periods only. 




It is a well known fact that one of the most serious problems 
faced by nearly all the developing countries is their excessive 
dependence on a very small number of basic export commodities, which 
provokes a high degree of instability in export earnings on the one 
hand and, on the other, limits the possibility of making the export 
sector more dynamic, owing to the relatively slow growth of world 
demand for most of these commodities» Trade liberalization policies 
(particularly those that cut down excessively high agricultural 
tari f fs in the developed countries).and measures to reduce or 
compensate for fluctuations in earnings may go a long way towards 
palliating the effects of excessive dependence on export products, 
although they obviously do nbt solve the problem in most cases* 
Policies for diversifying production and exports should, therefore, 
be given priority in all the plans or programmes of the developing 
countries, not only as a zaea&3 of eliminating the disadvantages ©f 
excessive specialization, but also as the necessary condition for 
speeding up the process of economic and social development* 
Prime responsibility for a policy of diversification of 
production and exports obviously l ies with the developing countries, 
which must establish the targets and objectives of the policies that 
are to guide their development programmes» However, the possibility 
of these countries' being able to carry out diversification programmes 
depends to a certain extent on how much progress is achieved in the 
field of financial co-operation and international trade. Indeed, a 
programme of diversification requires that investment funds be made 
available over a period of several years, which means that there 
must be a reasonable guarantee that the necessary external funds 
would be obtained to complement investment drawn from domestic 
saving. Moreover, the promotion of new productive activities requires 
that markets (those of the developed countries in particular) should be 
opened up through the liberalizatipn of trade fcy the adoption of a 




In the recommendations adopted at the f i rst session r>f UNOTJJD 
the problem of diversification was considered specifically in the 
context of international commodity agreements, in the Government ©f 
which funds could be established for the financing of programmes for 
the diversification of production. Thus, the International Coffee 
Agreement has a diversification fund financed by contributions from 
the exporting member countries of the Agreement ard by voluntary 
contributions from other countries. Although the setting up of 
similar funds was not envisaged in the other agreements in existence, 
the Development Strategy reaffirms the principle that specific funds 
for diversification would be one of the features of commodity 
arrangements wherever considered necessary« I t does not stop 
there, but considerably expands the targets to be aimed at by a 
diversification policy and binds the developed countries to 
co-operate in that task when i t states that developed countries 
should give increased attention within the framework of bilateral 
and multilateral programmes to supplementing the resources of the 
developing countries in their endeavour to accelerate the diversification 
of their economies with a view to the expansion of the production and 
exports of semi-manufactures and manufactures, as well as of 
semi-processed and processed commodities, broadening the patterns 
of exports in favour of commodities with relatively dynamic demand 
conditions and increasing food production in food deficient countries« 
In this connexion, the Development Strategy summarizes the principles 
and objectives that should guide diversification policy according to 
the text approved by the UNCTAD Committee on Commodities and endorsed 
by the Trade and Development Board at its eighth session« To ensure 
the proper implementation of this policy, the Secretary-General of 
UNCTAD, in co-operation with the competent specialized agencies and 
the regional development banks, is asked to draw up detailed proposals 
for the study of diversification problems in respect of products.that 
are over-produced or are subject to competition from synthetics and 
substitutes. In the same context, the Advisory Committee to the 
Board and to the Committee on Commodities stressed the advisability 
/ o f considering 
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of considering diversification as an integral part of national 
development plans, paying due attention to i ts repercussions in other 
countries and on world market prices for the commodities included in 
programmes of diversification, and to the need to establish some sort 
of system of regional or international consultation in order to 
achieve a certain degree of co-ordination between national diversification 
plans* The same Advisory Committee agreed to devote the whole of i ts 
next session (at the beginning of 1971) to the full-scale analysis 
and discussion of all the problems relating to diversification 
policies, with a view to deciding on the orientation to be given to 
those measures that are considered most suitable .for the eff ic ient 
application of those policies»-
In the context of the more pragmatic trend that is now being 
given to studies relating to the diversification of the economies of 
the developing countries, emphasis should be placed on the decision 
adopted by the International Bank in 1969 to support the efforts that 
countries are making to this end. Indeed, in accordance with the 
current standards and procedure of i ts credit poliey, the Bank is 1 
prepared to consider the following: 
( i ) Financing of projects that provide alternative employment 
for the factors employed in the production of goods that are in 
excess supply; 
( i i ) Financing of new activities in the primary sector which 
have fair ly favourable market prospects; 
( i i i ) Financing of industrial projects that use raw materials 
produced in the country concerned; 
( iv) Stimulating efforts towards regional co-operation between 
the developing countries, in particular through support for the 
establishment of new industries that require wider than national 
markets in order to be able to operate ef f ic iently ; 
(v) 
Participating in the financing of agricultural research 
activities and other priority research in the developing countries, 
as far as possible in co-operation with national and international 
institutionsj and last ly , 
/ (V i ) Through 
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(vi) Through donations or credit, as appropriate, to provide 
technical assistance in the preparation of programmes and projects 
(including feasibility studies) directed to achieving diversified 
development. 
7« Natural products facing competition from synthetics 
and substitutes 
In the recommendations adopted by UNCTAD at its f i rst session, 
i t was recognised that special problems are involved in trade in 
natural products subject to competition from synthetics and 
substitutes. The recommendation in annex A.II,7 pointed to the 
need for taking national and international action to improve the 
competitive position of primary commodities. The action proposed 
included measures to: intensify technical and market research on 
the uses of natural products; raise the technical efficiency of the 
production of natural products so as to reduce costs; avoid giving 
special encouragement to the production of synthetics and substitutes 
which may compete with natural products; and increase access to 
developed countries* markets through the elimination of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers against imports of natural products facing 
competition from synthetics and substitutes. As a result of this 
recommendation, the Permanent Group on Synthetics and Substitutes 
was set up and entrusted with carrying out studies leading to the 
implementation of the measures set forth in the recommendation. The 
Permanent Group has already held four meetings, at which i t has 
considered the special problems of certain natural products (rubber, 
cotton, sugar, hard fibres, mica and shellac); i t has also held 
consultations with the existing specialized agencies concerned with 
those products, but because of the complex nature of competition 
between synthetic and natural products, i t has not yet reached the 
stage of formulating concrete proposals on international action in 
this f ield, except for such proposals as refer to the elimination 
of tari f f and non-tariff barriers, and to the need to find financing 
for research activities as a matter of high priority. 
/ i n t h i s 
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In this connexion, the Development Strategy does no more than 
repeat the points already mentioned in the recommendation adopted 
by UNCTAD at its f i rs t session in annex A.II.7, in the work programme 
of the Permanent Group on Synthetics and Substitutes and in the 
declaration adopted by the Committee on Commodities at i ts fourth 
session. 
Disposal of surpluses and reserves 
The problems caused by the disposal of the developed countries' 
agricultural surpluses and strategic reserves on concessional terms 
have been considered in a number of recommendations adopted by 
international bodies since the mid-1950s. The f i r s t recommendation 
in this respect was adopted by FAO in 1954 in its Principles of 
Surplus Disposal, under which procedures were established for 
bilateral consultations between the countries exporting surpluses and 
interested third countries within the Consultative Committee on 
Surplus Disposal. Shortly afterwards, in March 1955, GATT adopted 
resolutions on surplus disposal and the sale of strategic reserves 
which also established procedures for consultation and notification. 
In both cases the object of consultations was to promote the orderly 
disposal of surpluses and reserves in order to protect as far as 
possible the interests of other countries that might be affected 
by such sales and to provide them with an opportunity to express their 
views on such transactions. 
Although several countries have always expressed dissatisfaction 
with the effectiveness of the procedures adopted for notification and 
consultation, i t was only relatively recently that i t was decided to 
take another look at the problem. 
At its forty-third session (October 1968), the FAO Committee 
on Comnodity Problems agreed to set up a Working Group to examine the 
role and terms of reference of the Consultative Committee on Surplus 
Disposal to consider " . . . in the light of developments in the nature 
and extent of extra-commercial transactions . . . what action on the 




Disposal . . . should be regarded as meeting their consultative 
o b l i g a t i o n s " . V i r t u a l l y simultaneously, the contracting parties 
of GATT in November 1968 approved a proposal by the Director-General 
which noted that i f future discussions by the contracting parties 
on the disposal of commodity surpluses were to be of more than a 
purely descriptive and historical nature, i t would be useful and 
desirable that the notification and consultation procedures under 
the resolution of 4 March 1955 be fundamentally revised* The contracting 
parties, in consequence, requested the GATT Agriculture Committee to 
consider appropriate procedures for the notification, consultation and 
discharge of responsibilities incumbent on contracting parties with 
respect to the disposal of surpluses and to report -to/the -Council^on the 
means whereby the existing procedures could be improved. 
Upon completion of the task assigned to i t , the Working Group 
established by the FAO Committee on Commodity Problems submitted a 
report in which i t " . . . recognized that important developments had 
occurred in the scope and nature of near-commercial and extra-commercial 
transactions ««• more commodities were affected by problems of surplus 
or over-abundant supplies, and a larger number of countries were 
involved«» Stocks of some commodities were again very heavy following 
a temporary reduction in the mid-sixties, when there had been an 
/ 
exceptional rise in demand. For some commodities, part of the 
supplies entering extra-commercial transactions now came from 
current production rather than from stocks. Also, there were increasing 
shipments of agricultural commodities in the *grey area1 between normal 
commercial trade and food ald,"^^ The Working Group considered that 
a pragmatic approach should be made to the revision.of procedures for 
notification and consultation and that the concept of surplus disposal 
should give way to an approach identifying the types of non-commercial 
transaction to which the procedures should apply. The Group itself drew up a 
tentative l ist including twenty different types of non-commercial transaction. 
26/ See FAO, Report of the Committee on Commodity Problems on its 
Forty-third Session fCCP/68/19). 
22/ See FAO, Report of the CCP Working Group on CSD functions 




The conclusions reached by the GATT Agriculture Committee 
recommended that the contracting parties should adopt a new resolution 
to define the principles that member countries should apply in the 
case of concessional transactions, the consultationsrthat they should 
undertake with other interested countries, and the system of notification 
regarding transactions effected, including notification of the procedures 
used in the consultation,, The Committee also recommended that the 
contracting parties should carry out an annual review of the development 
of such transactions on the basis of the notifications made by the 
member countries and an analytical study by the GATT Secretariat, 
At the twenty-sixth session of the GATT Contracting Parties, however, 
when the Agriculture Committee?s report was examined, i t was not possible 
to secure agreement, and the question was referred back to the 
Agriculture Committee for further discussion. 
The UNCTAD Committee on Commodities has also concerned itself 
with the problems of the disposal of agricultural surpluses and 
strategic reserves. Recommendation A.II . l of the f i rs t session of 
UNCTAD called on the developed countries to undertake to apply the 
FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal, adding that "the sale of surplus 
inventories, including strategic stockpiles of minerals, metals and 
raw materials, accumulated in developed countries should also be 
effected in accordance with internationally determined criteria,-
designed to ensure that such sales do not depress the prices of the 
commodities concerned or distort world trade to the detriment of 
exports from developing countries". During the second session of 
UNCTAD, however, i t was not possible to secure agreement on a proposal . 
sponsored by the developing countries, which was referred to the Trade 
and Development Board for further^consideration, The Committee on 
Commodities, which continued the study of this proposal, subsequently 
adopted decision 4 (5), containing the following recommendations: 
(a) Disposals of production surpluses, strategic reserves or 
other Government-held non-commercial inventories of primary products 
should be so conducted as to avoid or minimize the possible adverse 
effects upon: 




( i ) The trade, agricultural and mineral development of 
producing countries, including the investment o f capital in exploration 
and development of new supplies; 
( i i ) Commercial markets and regular commercial trade in 
these products; 
( i i i ) The position of developing countries "receiving these 
surpluses as assistance. 
(b) Disposals of agricultural surpluses should be made in 
accordance with the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal and in keeping 
with the notification and consultation procedures adopted by the FAO» 
(c) Disposals from strategic reserves and other Government-held 
non-commercial inventories of primary products not covered by the FAO 
Principles of Surplus Disposal should: 
( i ) Not be made without prior consultations, including 
terms and conditions of proposed sales, with Governments of producing 
countries which are members of UNCTAD; 
( i i ) Take into account the demand and supply position; 
( i i i ) Be spread over a reasonable period of time considering 
the quantities involved and the interests of countries concerned; 
(iv) Be re-examined promptly by the Governments concerned 
with a view to the moderation of such disposals i f certain unforeseen 
adverse situations arise for producers; 
(v) Be made on the basis of prevailing market prices and 
be conducted in such a way as to avoid or minimize the adverse effects 
on these prices. 
Lastly, the decision recommends that consultations on surplus 
and strategic reserve disposals should take place between the 
Government making the disposals, on the one hand, and the Governments 
of the producing countries members of UNCTAD and, the international 
agencies concerned, on the other hand, and that the procedures for 
such consultations should be widened and reinforced, or established 




The Trade and Development Board considered this decision of the 
UNCTAD Committee on Commodities during the f irst part of its tenth 
session (September 1970), and agreed to take note of i t . The 
recommendations made in the decision basically cover the principles 
and norms that should govern the disposal of surpluses and reserves 
and the reinforcing of the notifications and consultations system 
outlined in the proposals of the CCP Working Group on CSD Functions 
of FAO and the GATT Agriculture Committee, These are the bodies\ 
responsible for adopting the necessary resolutions, for i t is they 
that house the machinery for notification and consultation and hence 
wil l have to comply with the recommendation on this topic contained 






1. Expansion of exports of manufactures 
and semi-manufactures 
The agreement reached by the UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences 
for the establishment of a general system of non-discriminatory and non-
reciprocal preferences benefiting exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures 
from the developing countries is undoubtedly a major step forward in the 
sphere of international economic co-operation, and a step that opens up 
new prospects for the creation of conditions that facilitate the emergence 
of new trade flows or the expansion of existing flows. The characteristics 
of preferential treatment (product,coverage, type of preference, amount 
of imports enjoying preference, escape clauses) are not uniform in all the 
developed countries but represent mutually acceptable bases susceptible of 
future improvement, as may be deemed advisable in the light of periodic 
reviews of the system and its operation. In this connexion, i t should be 
pointed out that the Latin American- countries made a declaration expressing 
their concern at the exclusion of products of special interest to the 
developing countries, in which they reiterated the need for a considerable 
expansion in coverage of processed agricultural products,and for an 
improvement in the preferential margins applied in respect of those products; 
they also proposed a set of additional measures that would allow the least 
developed of the developing countries to take advantage of the concessions 
established in the scheme of preferences.-^^ 
The general system of preferences s t i l l has to be ratified or to 
obtain legislative sanction in each of the developed countries that .are 
granting preferences, and i t is hoped that this procedure will be completed 
in the course of 1971. However, before the system enters into force, i t 
will be necessary to reach agreement on certain points that were not resolved 
by the Special Committee on Preferences, one of which concerns, the 
institutional machinery that should be set up to supervise the fulfilment 
28/ See UNCTAD statement by the countries of the Latin Afterican group members 
of the Group of 77 on certain aspects of the general scheme of 




of the objectives mentioned in Resolution 21 (II) and 24 (II) adopted by 
UNCTAD at its second session, in respect of the system of generalized 
preferences and special measures to be taken in favour of the least developed 
among the developing countries. The powers with which this institutional 
machinery should be endowed were defined in the Agreed Conclusions of the 
Special Committee on Preferences, but the Trade and Development Board 
postponed a decision as regards the bpdy that should be given such powers 
within UNCTAD to i ts eleventh session (August-September 1971)• As prior 
agreement exists as to what these.powers should be, no major diff iculties 
are expected to arise in this connexion. However, the aspects relating 
to special and reverse preferences raise problems that may be more 
di f f i cult to solve, in view of the attitude that has been maintained by 
the developed and developing countries that participate in these trade 
arrangements. Indeed, these countries consider that the system of general 
preferences is compatible with the retention of special and reverse 
preferences, though this position is opposed by the countries that do not 
take part in arrangements of this kind. Although special and reverse 
preferences are closely interrelated, the Special Committee on Preferences 
made a distinction between them in its Agreed Conclusions and noted that 
the problem of reverse preferences will require further consultation, 
which should be pursued as a matter of urgency, with a view to finding 
solutions before the system of generalized preferences come into force. 
A more flexible attitude was adopted in respect of special preferences, 
on the understanding that the general system of preferences will provide 
those countries that currently enjoy special preferences with export 
opportunities that at least compensate for their having to share their 
current advantages in some markets.-^/ This understanding will permit 
special preferences to exist side by side with the general system, at least 
during the f irst few years. 
29/ See UNCTAD, Report of the^Sgecial Committee on Preferences on the 




The situation that has arisen with regard to the discriminatory 
nature of special and reverse preferences is partly the result of the 
indulgent attitude towards such arrangements adopted by the great majority 
of countries that do not-participate in them. Indeed, recommendation 
A.II . l of the f i rst session of UNCTAD provided for the progressive 
elimination of special preferential arrangements, but not only was no 
initiative taken to that end, but, on the contrary, new preferential 
agreements continued to be drawn up, so that the number of countries 
interested in maintaining such agreements has increased considerably. 
Moreover, within GATT, where a decision could have been adopted to define 
clearly the extent of the compatibility - i f any, for many countries 
considered there was no such compatibility - between special preferential 
agreements and provisions in respect of free-trade areas, i t was preferred 
to take the line of least resistance, by neither approving nor rejecting 
such agreements, and deferring any decision on the subject indefinitely. 
Thus, on the expiry after five years of the f i rst Yaounde Convention, a 
second Convention was negotiated for a further five years, together with 
further special preferential agreements. 
The possible expansion of the European Economic Community through 
the entry of the United Kingdom and other European countries is now making 
the problem of special preferential agreements more acute. Indeed, i f the 
negotiations for the accession of the United Kingdom and other European 
countries are successful, the countries that currently have preferential 
arrangements with the Community will obtain the same preferential 
advantages in the territories of the new members, while the latter will 
benefit by the concessions offered by those countries; in other words, 
the area covered by special and reverse preferences will be considerably 
expanded. In addition, however, the entry of the United Kingdom would 
require the negotiation of new agreements to define the position within 
the framework of an expanded EEC of those developing countries that currently 
form part of the British Commonwealth system of preferences. It can be* 
seen, therefore, that a possible extension of the area of trade covered 
by agreements on special and reverse preferences raises some very serious 
queries as to the final characteristics of the generalized system of preference 
and the date on which i t may come into force. 
> /As regards 
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As regards the e^qaansion. of : the developing., countries1 trade in 
manufactures and semi-manufactures, the Development Strategy does no 
more than note that special attention will be given to the expansion and • 
diversification of the export trade of those countries in manufactures and 
semi-manufactures, so as to enable them to attain increased participation 
in the growth of international trade in these products. It also repeats 
the recommendation on the maintenance of the standstill commitment and the 
intensification of intergovernmental consultations for the progressive 
elimination of norh-tariff barriers (to which reference was made in 
section 5 of this report), and confirms the decision to pursue efforts 
to improve arrangements for the establishment of a generalized system of 
preferences, in the light of the objectives of resolution 21 (II) adopted 
by UNCTAD at its second session. 
There are two further aspects relating to the expansion of the 
developing countries1 trade in manufactures and semi-manufactures that 
deserve consideration, namely, adjustment measures in the developed 
countries and restrictive business practices. 
2. Adjustment measures' in the developed countries 
International action to liberalize trade and improve access to 
markets with a view to facilitating exports from the developing countries 
may be largely frustrated i f the growth of exports from these countries 
to the developed countries gives rise to the application of restrictions 
of any kind based on general escape clauses or on such concepts as "market 
disruption'1. Among the recommendations adopted at the f irst session of 
UNCTAD, that contained in annex A.III.6 (on measures by the developed 
countries with market economies for expansion and. diversification of exports 
of manufactures and semi-manufactures by developing countries) recommended 
that the developed countries should adopt programmes and measures for 
assisting the adaptation and adjustment of industries and workers in 
situation where they might be adversely affected by increased imports 
from the developing countries• Previously, the contracting parties of 




party to study the problems raised by the application of import restrictions 
based on "market disruption"; but the report of the working party did not 
lead to acceptable solutions and attempts to establish standards in this 
field were abandoned. Subsequently, the GATT Committee on Trade and 
Development agreed to set up a Group of Experts on Adjustment Assistance 
Measures, which was instructed, inter alia, "to report on the measures being 
applied, or proposed to be applied, by industrialized countries for assisting 
adjustments in the changing structure and pattern of production, so as to 
permit an expansion of international trade in products of interest to less 
developed countries and to provide larger opportunities for' imports from 
these countries". The establishment of this Group of Experts reflected 
an important change in the approach to these problems, for instead 
establishing principles and standards for.the application of restrictions 
based on "market disruption" (which in any case would always run counter 
to the objective of increasing imports from the developing countries), 
i t was recognized that the solution consisted in promoting the necessary 
adjustments in the industries affected by competition from imported ; 
products. In this connexion, the Committee on Trade and Development 
expressed the following views: 
"The Committee has continued i ts examinations of the question of 
adjustment assistance measures on the basis of information submitted by 
governments. The Committee recalled its earlier discussions on the role 
of adjustment assistance as an instrument of trade liberalization. It noted 
that the view had now evolved in at least some developed countries that 
adjustment assistance measures could be a more desirable alternative to 
measures restricting imports in dealing with sectors in the national 
economy which were particularly sensitive to trade liberalization, and 
that the governments of certain of these countries were seeking, legislation 
which would facil itate resort to these measures» It also noted that 
there was a trend towards the increasing use of adjustment assistance 
policies, sometimes specifically to deal with the problems of trade 




adapting industrial structures to technological developments in a more 
efficient pattern of international specialization. Some members of the 
Committee hoped that in utilizing these measures greater attention would 
be paid to applying them to deal with the specific problems of developing 
countries. 
In this connexion, i t should be pointed out that one way of providing 
more suitable protection for the interests of the developing countries would 
be to make a distinction between the dif f iculties caused by increased 
exports from other developed countries and those that come mainly from 
developing countries. It is well known that the problems faced by certain 
developed countries as a result of the rapid growth of certain imports are 
largely due to increases in such imports from other developed countries, 
precisely because the greatest progress in the field of trade liberalization 
has been achieved in the sector of manufactures, which are traded mainly 
between the developed countries. It is therefore unfair that restrictions 
designed to solve the problems of increased imports should be applied to 
countries like the developing countries, which are not the chief culprits 
in this connexion,. It is therefore, suggested that, without prejudice to 
the commitment to adopt measures to facilitate the process of structural 
adjustment of the affected industries, the developed countries facing 
problems of this kind should exempt imports from the developing countries 
from al l restrictions. 
The Development Strategy reiterates the principles that the developed 
countries should consider adopting measures and programmes for assisting 
the adaptation and adjustment of industries and workers in situations where 
they are adversely affected or may be threatened to be adversely affected 
by increased imports of manufactures and semi-manufactures from developing 
countries; this recommendation is particularly opportune since i t comes 
at a time when the developed countries are proposing to grant certain 
preferential tari f fs in favour of exports from developing countries. 
Indeed, the system of generalized preferences in favour of these countries, 
J30/ GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Seventeenth 
Supplement, Geneva, May 1970, pp. 125 and 126. 
/ in so 
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in so far as they achieve their objective, will encourage an increase in 
imports from the developing countries, and i t would be incongruous for the 
developed countries to apply restrictions to limit that increase instead 
of promoting the necessary adjustments in the industrial sectors affected 
by competition from imported products from the developing countries. In 
the Agreed Conclusion on the generalized system of preferences, some 
countries, particularly those of the EEC, chose to establish in advance 
a limit on the total value of imports benefiting by tari f f preferences, 
equivalent to total imports from the beneficiary countries in a given 
period plus 5 per cent of total imports from other sources; other countries 
(the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada) do not specify an advance 
limit on such imports but reserve the right to apply the normal escape 
clause procedure when such imports seriously jeopardise or threaten to 
jeopardise the position of national producers. Although these countries 
declared that recourse to escape clauses would remain exceptional, i t is 
obvious that such measures, and the possibility of withdrawing concessions 
or modifying those already granted, maintain an element of uncertainty 
which might, in many cases, discourage the implementation of plans for the 
expansion of production in the developing countries. Hence the importance 
of the developed countries' giving priority to the application of measures 
for assisting internal adjustment, instead of restrictions based on escape 
clauses. It should also be insisted upon that the resort to and 
interpretation of escape clauses, in those cases where i t is essential 
that they be maintained, should be subject to a system of consultation 
between the country invoking the clause and the other interested parties, 
so as to restrict their use to genuinely exceptional cases and to ensure 
that their applications would be only temporary, or to ailow the negotiation 
of other concessions to compensate for those that are withdrawn. 
As regards the effectiveness of the adjustment assistance measures 
in the developed countries, the experience of the United States should be 
borne in mind. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which empowered the 
United States Government to make concessions in the Kennedy Round 




aid to industries and workers affected by increased imports; in.practice, 
however, the Act was inoperable because of the conditions attached to 
that aid. In contrast, the 1965 Act on products of the motor-vehicle 
industry, which provided for various forms of aid over a period of three 
years for industries and workers affected by the agreement reached with 
Canada, made i t possible to satisfy most requests for aid submitted in 
accordance with the provisions of that agreement. The lack of a legal,.. 
instrument of this kind has doubtless favoured the growth of protectionist 
pressures in certain industrial and labour circles in the United States, 
as is shown by the large number of protectionist b i l ls submitted to 
Congress during the last two years,and which have been reintroduced this 
year. In all fairness, i t must be said that the executive branch of 
Government in the United States has been more inclined to apply a programme 
of adjustment assistance than to apply restrictive measures, being aware 
that such measures would be a deterrent to further progress in the process 
of trade liberalization, and of the danger involved in the application 
of such measures by other developed countries. ^ ^ 
3« Restrictive business practices 
Resolution 25 (II) of the second session of UNCTAD requested that the 
organizations secretariat carry out a study on the question of the 
restrictive business practices adopted by private enterprises of developed 
countries, with a view to examining the effects of such practices on the 
export interests of the developing countries. The topic of restrictive 
business practices has been on the agenda of international agencies for 
31/ In this connexion, i t is appropriate to quote a paragraph from a letter 
sent by the President of the United States to the Chairman of the House 
Ways and Means Committee, recommending the approval of a b i l l on trade 
legislation: "It is my intention to marshal the forces of the executive 
branch to expedite efficient adjustment to economic changes brought about 
by increased imports. I intend to activate the Trade Adjustment Assistanc 
Advisory Board called for in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to lead a 
broad co-ordinated effort to make adjustments assistance more effective 
in opening opportunities for workers and firms. I also intend to 
request additional funds for adjustment assistance as they are needed". 




many years (above a l l in the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
and GATT) but i t has so far proved impossible to adopt appropriate 
international nbras. Chapter V of the Havana Charter was the f i rst 
attempt to establish a procedure for investigating these practices, which 
were defined as measures adopted by public or private commercial enterprises 
to restrain competition, limit access to markets or foster monopolistic 
control. Around 1955> a number of developed countries members of GATT 
proposed that the General Agreement be amended to include provisions 
governing restrictive business practices similar to those adopted at-Havana, 
but no agreement could be reached; later, in I960, the contracting parties 
adopted a decision on Arrangements for Consultations^on Restrictive Business 
Practices under which at the request of any contracting party, consultations 
should be initiated on a bilateral or multilateral basis So as to reach 
satisfactory solutions on these matters. The consultation arrangements were 
established in view of the fact that most countries fe l t that i t was'-.not * 
feasible to negotiate a multilateral agreement on the control of restrictive 
business practices. ^ ^ 
The Development Strategy recommends that restrictive business practices 
particularly affecting the trade of developing countries should be identified 
with a view to the consideration of appropriate remedial measures. Thus 
both UNCTAD resolution 25 (II) and the Development Strategy implicitly 
recognize the extreme diff iculty of settihg as a target the negotiations 
of an international agreement on the subject»' The approach adopted and the 
investigation and identification of these practices and of their impact 
on the trade of developing countries may, however, be the quickest way of 
promoting international discussion of the steps that could be taken to 
offset their harmful effects. 
32/ The text of the decision arAd the report of the Group .of experts on which 
i t was based can be found in GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 




C. EXTERNAL FINANCING 
As for international trade, the Development Strategy reiterates 
principles, objectives and policies concerning external development financing 
which have already been the objective of decisions and recommendations in 
many international forums rover the past few years. All these decisions -and 
recommendations have aimed, on the one hand, at promoting a substantially 
increased flow of financial resources to developing countries and, on. the 
other, at further liberalizing the corresponding terms and conditions. " 
Like all recommendations on external financing before i t , the Development 
Strategy recognizes that financial assistance for development plays only 
a secondary role to internal investment designed to promote the fullest 
possible mobilization of each country's domestic resources. In order to 
ensure the most effective use of their internal and external resources, 
developing countries undertake, inter alia, to adopt any fiscal and 
administrative reforms that may be necessary, evolve strategies for 
expanding agricultural activities, and strengthen their systems for formulating 
and implementing development plans. In the global approach of the 
Development Strategy there is a close link between the measures to be taken 
at the national level by developing countries and those that l ie essentially 
within the sphere of international economic co-operation; the fulfilment of 
the targets and objectives laid down, in the Strategy will depend on the 
achievement of proper co-ordination between domestic and international 
measures and policies, both in the field of trade and in that of external 
financial assistance. Consequently, the periodic review and appraisal, of 
these targets andobjectives provides an opportunity not only to discover 
any possible shortcomings and the reasons for them, but also to examine at 
the international level the various measures and policies adopted by 
developing countries, in tacit recognition of the fact that the Development 
Strategy is an enterprise undertaken by the world community with reciprocal 
commitments whose fulfilment is of concern to a l l countries equally. 
In the field of external financing, or as i t is usually called, 
development assistance, international action has been rather more successful 




liberalization in favour of developing countries poses a .number of domestic 
market problems for the developed countries, financial assistance (largely 
in the form of loans) not only is mostly recoverable but also helps to ' 
promote the donor countries1 om exports, especially when i t i s in the 
form of tied loans. This aspect vail not, be re-examined here, however. 
In adopting the Development Strategy, the countries that voted for i t opted 
for a concerted effort at both the national and the international levels 
to give developing countries more opportunities for their trade and more 
financial resources for their development. This is the context in which 
the external financing measures are examined below, 
1/ Target for the transfer of financial resources 
to developing countries 
Among the recommendations on international financial co-operation , 
adopted at the f irst session of UNCTAD, annex A.IV.2 established that each 
economically advanced country should endeavour to supply financial resources 
to the developing countries of a net minimum amount approaching as nearly 
as possible to 1 per cent of i ts national income. This recommendation was 
endorsed in 1965 by the developed countries.members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (GECD) which set a dead-line of three years for its 
implementation and specified the various forms, the transfer of financial 
resources could take (grants, o f f i c ia l transfer payments and private 
loans, e t c . ) . Nevertheless, from 1960-1962 to 1965-1967 there was in fact 
a relative decline in the total volume of net private and public financial 
transfers to developing countries by the members of DAC as a whole, since 
they dropped from an average of 1.11 per cent of the national income of 
the developed countries to 0.95 per cent over the period indicated.^/ 
This was due mainly to the reduction in transfers from the United States 
(which just managed to exceed the 1 per cent target only in 1961). and 
from certain European countries (notably, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
33/ See OECD, Development Assistance: Efforts and Policies of'the Members 




the United Kingdom and Switzerland) which had reached much higher percentages 
during the three-year period from 1960-1962. . 
With a view to increasing the net volume of financial resource 
transfer to developing countries at i ts second session U N C T A D adopted 
resolution 27 ( I I ) , which raised the previous target to 1 per cent of 
the gross national product at market prices. In accepting this target, 
some developed countries pledged themselves to reach i t by 1972, or 1975 
at the latest, while others f e l t that they could not set any specific 
date for ful f i l l ing such a commitment. Total external development 
financing, however, has continued its relative decline: thus, the 
average volume of transfers, which had stood at 0.91 per cent of the 
gross national product in 1961-1962, had dropped to 0#76 per cent by 
1968-1969. In the latter period, only four European countries (Belgium, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands) succeeded in 
bettering the target of 1 per cent of-their gross national product, while 
Italy and Denmark exceeded i t in 1969» Transfers from the United States 
(which is s t i l l the major source of development assistance) continued to 
fa l l o f f , standing at 0.65 per cent in 1968 and 0.49 per cent in 1969, 
compared with an average of 0.79 for 1960 -1962^ The total net transfers 
of all the developed countries members of DAC in 1968 and 1969 were 
0.78 per cent and 0*74 per cent of the g*oss national product, respectively. 
These figures show that the trend in recent year has been to drift 
further away from, rather than come closer to, the target for the transfer 
of financial resources from developed to developing countries* In the 
Development Strategy, the developed countries have nonetheless reaffirmed 
their determination to attain the target by 1972, or by 1975 at the latest, 
which necessarily implies a change in the trend of net financial resource 
transfer from the United States whose percentage share of the gross 
national product has shrunk considerably in recent years and may be expected 
to shrink s t i l l further in view of the cut-back in the appropriations 
34/ Figures taken from CECD, Development Assistance: Efforts and 
Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee 




under this head. The relative decrease in" United States transfer payments 
hits the Latin American countries, particularly hard since this is the 
source from which they receive most of their external financial assistance. 
2. Composition of financial resource transfer 
The total volume of financial resource transfers to developing 
countries is only one of the important factors in evaluating financial 
assistance for development. Another significant factor is the composition 
of these flows: grants, o f f i c ia l loans, private investment, suppliers1 
credits, credit from multilateral financing agencies. The importance of 
bilateral and multilateral flows in the total volume of financial resource 
transfers is recognized, in UNCTAD resolution 2? (Il)> and although there 
was no consensus in determining the minimum percentage which o f f i c i a l 
resources should represent within the general target of 1 per cent of 
the gross national, product, a number of developed countries expressed their 
intention of bringing the o f f i c ia l flows up to at least 0.75 per cent of 
the product; other developed countries, even though they did not believe 
i t was possible to establish a minimum percentage, agreed that endeavours 
should be made to ensure that o f f i c ia l flows should represent a substantial 
part of the total financial resources provided. 
Official financial resource transfers showed an unfavourable trend 
in the 1960s. For the group of countries members of the Development 
Assistance Committee, the average percentage dropped from 0*53 per cent 
of theg^oss national product in 1960-1962 to 0.49 per cent in 1965-1967, and 
0.38 and 0.36 per cent in 1968 and 1969 respectively, according to the 
above-mentioned source. In the last two years mentioned, none of the 
countries members of DAC came close to the 0.75 per cent target. 
In these circumstances, the following recommendation made in the 
International Development Strategy is of particular importance: "In 
recognition of the special importance of the role which can be ful f i l led 
only by of f ic ia l development assistance, a major part of financial resource 
transfers to the developing countries should be provided in the form of 




progressively increase i ts o f f i c ia l development assistance to the developing 
countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount 
of 0.7 per cent of i ts gross national product at market prices by the 
middle of the Decade"* 
3. Softening of the terms and conditions of financial aid 
A third important factor in the examination of financial resource 
transfers to developing countries relates to the terms and conditions on 
which financial assistance is provided. • In .recommendation A.TV.4 of the N 
f irst UNCTAD session, which was adopted with the developed countries 
voting against i t or abstaining, stress was laid on the need for 
financial assistance to be provided in such a way as to constitute meaningful 
aid to developing countries, as consistent with the following conditions: 
( i ) aid should be a blend of grants and loans} ( i i ) repayment of loans 
may be accepted in national currencies of the debtor countries or in the 
for:n of goods exported by themj ( i i i ) repayments should be spread over 
a considerable period at low interest rates; and (iv) there should be a 
more flexible policy with respect to tied loans. Although this 
recommendation was not supported by the developed countries, the members 
of DAG adopted another recommendation in July 1965 in which they 
recognised the need, f i rs t , for a certain degree of harmonization of the 
.terms and conditions, on which financial aid was provided by the various 
countries and, secondly, for the softening of financial terms and 
conditions. A3 regards the second point, the above-mentioned recommendation 
establishes that developed countries should endeavour to meet one or other 
of the following conditions: (a) that 70 per cent or more of all o f f i c ia l 
aid commitments be given in the form of grants or as grant-like contributions 
(involving no repayment in foreign exchange); (b) that these o f f i c ia l 
commitments be extended in three ways: ( i ) a pro portion of 81 per cent to 
be given either as grants or at 3 P©r cent or less interest charges, 
/ ( i i ) 82 
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( i i ) 82 per cent to comprise grants and loans with repayment periods of 
twenty-five years and more, and ( i i i ) the weighted average grace period 
35/ 
of new loan commitments to be seven years or more*—-7 
It should be noted that, in some respects, the targets established 
in the recommendation for the softening of the terms and conditions of 
o f f i c ia l financial aid were no more ambitious than those which the group 
of countries members of DAC had already attained in 1964» To a large 
extent, the essential objective seemed to be to achieve greater 
harmonization of the terms applied by the various countries. The apparent 
result, however, was to achieve such, harmonization at the level of the least 
favourable terms accorded by some countries. In fact, for all the DAG 
member countries the weighted average terms and conditions of o f f i c ia l 
financing had deteriorated in 196? compared with 1964, as shown by the 
following figures: 
1964^ 1963^ 
Grants as a percentage of 
total commitments 59 55 
Maturity (years) 28.4 23*4 
Interest rate (percentages) 3*0 3*8 
Grace period (years) 6.9 5*3 
a/ OECD, Development Assistance Efforts and Policies of the 
Members of the Development Assistance Committee, 19-&& Review, 
pp. 159-160. 
b/ OECD. Development Assistance Efforte and Policies of the 
Members of the Development Assistance Committee, 1968 Review, 
J>i> 62. 
In the face of this relative deterioration in the terms of o f f i c ia l 
financial assistance, UNCTAD, at i ts second session, adopted resolution 
29 ( I I ) , in which i t recommended that developed countries should renew 
their efforts to achieve by the end ©f 1968 the objectives established 
35/ See OECD, Development Assistance Efforts and Policies of the Members 
of the Development Assistance Committee, 1965 Revietr, ^September 1965); 
page 119. 
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in the 1965 DAC recommendation. Considering further that developed 
countries were prepared to review this recommendation, i t proposed that, in 
the interests of achieving a greater measure of liberalization, either 
developed countries might provide 80 per cent or more of their o f f i c ia l 
aid in the form of grants, or*they might provide 90 fier cent as grants or 
loans, at 2.5 per cent interest or less, with a repayment period of thirty 
years or more and a minimum grace period of eight years. The supplementary 
recommendation adopted by DAC in February 1969, while not in line with 
the proposals adopted, at the second session of UMCTAD, made for further 
liberalization by establishing that: ( i ) countries extending 70 per cent 
or more of their total o f f i c ia l financial assistance in the form of grants 
or grant-like contributions were considered to meet the terms objectives 
of the DAC, and ( i i ) , countries not falling under thé above provision 
should use their best efforts to provide at least 85 per cent of their 
o f f i c ia l development assistance commitments so that each transaction has 
a minimum concessional element of 61 per cent, or to ensure that 85 per cent 
of those commitments contain an average concessional element of at least 
85 per cent.^^ It should be recognized that the efforts to achieve a 
further softening of the terms and conditions of o f f i c ia l financial aid 
are showing some progress, at least in relation to those recorded 
in 1967® The 1968 and 1969 figures show the following results:*^ 
1968 1969 
Grants- as a percentage of total 
commitments . 5 8 66 
Maturity (years) 30.7 28*4 
Interest rate (percentages) 2.7 2.9 
Grace period (years) 7.2 6.7 
2§f See QECD, Development Assistance Efforts and Policies of the Members 
of_the Development Assistance Committee» 1969 Review (December 1969), 
P* 2697 
37/ See 0ECD, Development Assistance Efforts and Policies of the Members 
of the Development Assistance Committee, 1^70 Review, _(December 1970), 




The Development Strategy reaffirms the developed countries* decision 
to continue their efforts to reach, before 31 December 1971> the norms set 
out in the supplementary recommendation adopted by DAC in 1969, and to 
consider, in the further evolution of their development assistance policy, 
the suggestions contained in U N C T A D resolution 29 (ll)# 
4« Untying financial assistance 
Tied credit is another of the aspects relating to-the 
softening of the terms and conditions of financial assistance for 
development that has been a matter of some concern to the developing 
countries» It is generally recognized that one of the reasons "why the 
developed countries tie credit to purchases in the donor country is to 
reduce the foreign exchange cost of financial assistance, particularly 
i f they are running balancesinpayments def ic its . Furthermore, i t is also 
recognized that tied Credits force up the import costs of the recipient 
countries, limit their freedom to choose more economic sources of supply, 
even in other developing countries, and in general run counter to the basic 
principle of multilateral trade without discrimination. Nevertheless, i t 
has not proved possible to bring any appreciable reduction in the use of 
tied credit because i t has been thought that this might well bring a 
reduction in the total amount of financial assistance. 
This last point has been borne in mind in UNCTAD1s recommendations 
on the question of tied aid, notably resolution 29 ( i l ) adopted in 1968, 
which states that; "The Conference, therefore, considers that, in principle, 
financial assistance should be untied. Many donors, however, find i t 
necessary to tie their aid, mainly in order to protect their balance of 
payments or to secure public support for their aid programmes. The 
tying of aid is therefore directly related to the level of aid% 
Resolution 29 (II ) also suggested practical steps for mitigating the 
effects of aid tying, including the following: ( i ) a greater provision for 
the use of aid funds to cover local costs; ( i i ) allowing of procurement 
in developing countries; ( i i i ) a broadening of the range of commodities 
or services to which aid may be devoted so that recipients have reasonable 




and (v ) , a development of pooling systems under which contracts might 
be decided by international competitive bidding within a group of donor 
countries. 
The International Development Strategy gives formal expression to 
the decision of the developed countries to take what measures they can to 
reduce the extent of tying of assistance and to mitigate any of its 
harmful effects. In this respect, the United States in late 1969 agreed 
to some degree of liberalisation so in the conditions of the financial 
aid supplied, through its Agency for International Development (AID) by 
authorizing purchases with AID funds in the United States and in developing 
countries, and eliminating other costly restrictions such as the requirement 
of additionally. 
5» Excessive external indebtedness 
In recent years, certain developing countries have been facing 
increasing problems because the share represented by foreign capital 
servicing in their total earnings from exports of goods and services 
has been expanding. To some extent, the situation has become worse 
because of the slow growth of their total export earnings, but i t is 
also due to the growing weight assigned in certain countries to forms of 
financial transfers, such as suppliers1 credits, which are generally 
short- or medium-term l iabi l i t ies . It should be remembered, however, that 
although the volume and composition of the external public debt has been 
one of the main factors responsible for the situation in some developing 
countries, servicing of the debt cannot be considered in isolation from 
other factors, such as the external private debt and the profits earned by 
foreign private investment. Taking servicing only of the external public 
debt, in only five Latin American countries did debt servicing represent 
20 per cent or more of total export earnings in respect of goods and 
services in 1968; but, i f the total external debt is taken into account, 
then this proportion is considerably above 20 per cent in fifteen countries 




Clearly, the problems deriving from the excessive burden of servicing 
the external public debt can be mitigated as and when some of the objectives 
set for the liberalization of o f f i c ia l financial assistance are met and 
the developing countries experiencing these problems manage to speed up 
the rate of growth of their export earnings. This latter, in turn, 
depends upon making considerable progress in liberalizing access to the 
developed countries' markets (to promote expansion of the developing 
countries1 exports) and on whether the investment effected with external 
credit generates the increments in the payments capacity that are required 
to service i t . UNCTAD recommendations and the International Strategy 
emphasize that the developing countries must apply sound principles to the 
administration of the external debt but they also note that in debt crises 
the countries concerned should stand ready to take suitable measures to 
refinance the debt or reschedule servicing on more favourable terms. 
6. Promotion of foreign private investment 
There is general agreement that foreign private investment can make 
a contribution to speeding up the economic growth of the developing countries, 
not only as regards expanding the total amount of investment resources but 
also because such investment is usually accompanied by an inflow of 
technical know-how and management expertise. In the particular case of 
the Latin American countries, i t is quite certain that the attitude has 
been generally favourable towards foreign private investment, and this 
is confirmed by the fact that foreign private investment in Latin American 
countries amounted to 15,700 million dollars in 1966, compared with a 
total of 30,000 million dollars for the developing countries as a whole. 
This favourable attitude, however, is not imcompatible with the tendency 
of some developing countries to apply more selective criteria to foreign 
private investment, a tendency which is really an expression of the 
concern of these countries regarding the scale of foreign private 
investment, which has taken the form of the purchase, pure and simple, 
of established commercial, industrial and financial establishments and 
which therefore involves a gradual "de-nationalization" of productive 




•n the one hand they need foreign private investment to supplement domestic 
saving, but on the other they have to delimit the areas in which they 
consider that foreign private investment is not appropriate or incompatible 
with the objectives and priorities of national development policy. In 
the Latin American Cónsénsus of Viña del Mar, the countries of the region 
stated some of the principles they consider essential with respect to 
foreign private investment, and also their concern regarding some of its 
adverse effects, in the following terms: 
"Foreign private investment, subject to national decisions and. 
priorities, should try to promote the mobilization of internal 
resources, create income and prevent outflows of foreign 
currency, promote savings and national research, make a real 
technological contribution, and act as a complementary factor 
in national investment, preferably in association with i t . 
This has not always been so in the past. Concern was shown 
for the over-all scale of the external financial flow caused 
by private foreign investment and. also for the excessive use 
of local financial resources and the effect of certain marketing 
agreements which distort competitive conditions in internal 
and external markets, and their possible effects on the economic 
development of the region." 38/ 
This statement reaffirms the need for the developing countries 
to carry out a thorough review and appraisal of their policy regarding 
foreign private investment, in order to identify clearly not only the 
fields in which such investment can contribute most efficiently to 
economic development, in accordance with national objectives and priorities, 
but also the terms and conditions i t must meet in order to be compatible 
with such objectives and priorities» 
This would assist in establishing the proper basis for the foreign 
investor and the country concérned to conclude agreements of a kind that 
would, ensure stability and security for the investment, and would also 
comply with a l l the many recommendations on the promotion of private foreign 
investment contained in the resolutions adopted by U N C T A D and the United 
Nations General Assembly. 
38/ The Latin American Consensus of Vina del Mar, document approved by 
the Extraordinary Meeting, at Cabinet level, of the Special Committee 
on Latin American Coordination, 15-17 May 1969, published by the 




In this respect, the International Development Strategy, while 
recommending that the developing countries should adopt appropriate 
measures for stimulating the inflow of foreign private capital in a manner 
consistent with national development plans, also recommends that foreign 
investors should endeavour to provide for an increase in the local share 
in the management and administration of foreign enterprises and facilitate 
the participation of local capital» This part of the Strategy is in line 
with certain suggestions designed to promote participation by local 
capital and foreign capital in joint enterprises, or alternatively 
establishing from the outset under what terms and conditions local 
capital will be brought in over a predetermined period.^/ i t is worth 
mentioning too that the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, in i ts 
decision No. 24 of December 1970, approved a common regime for the 
treatment of foreign capital and for trade marks, patents, licenses and 
royalties, which contains principles and standards that may be extremely 
useful as guidelines for the contribution of foreign private investment 
during the current stage of Latin American development. The regime 
contains, inter alia, the following provisions:^/ 
( i ) Access of fresh foreign investment will be restricted in the 
following' sectors: insurance, commercial banking and other financial 
institutions, internal transportation, advertising and the domestic 
marketing of goods of al l types; 
( i i ) During the f i rs t ten years following the entry into force of 
the conimon regime, foreign investment in the basic commodities sector, 
may be granted concessions for periods not exceeding twenty years; 
( i i i ) Foreign investment will not be authorized in activities which 
are considered to be adequately covered by existing enterprises; 
(iv) Participation by foreign investors in national or mixed 
enterprises may be authorized where such participation would bring an 
3.9/ In this connexion see La inversión privada extranjera en el desarrollo 
latinoamericano, a report submitted to the Sixth Annual Meetings ©f 
the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-EC0S0C), 
document CIES/1371, 28 April 1969. 
40/ The complete text can be found in Carta Semanal IPE, La Paz, 




expansion of capital and provided that i t does not alter the level of 
national ownership of the enterprise concerned; 
(v) Contracts for the import of technology or covering patents or 
trade marks must be approved by the competent authority of the respective 
country; authorization will not be extended to contracts which impose 
restrictions a,s to sources of supply, volume of production, price of 
products, or other restrictions of equivalent effect ; 
(vi) Conditions are established governing the extent to which 
existing foreign enterprises may benefit from the advantages of the 
liberalization of subregional trade; 
(v i i ) Conditions and dead-lines are established forithe phased 
transformation of fresh foreign investment into mixed enterprises, 
1% Supplementary financial measures 
Discussions on the question of establishing"a scheme of supplementary 
financing, designed to deal with the problems caused by adverse movements 
in the export earnings of the developing countries, have not yet achieved 
positive results. The proposals developed by the International Bank, 
following the recommendation in annex A.IV.8 of the f irst session of 
UNCTADj were examined by the Inter-governmental Group on Supplementary 
Financing, which was unable to reach agreement on the principles and 
method of operation of the scheme. Resolution 30 ( I I ) , adopted at the 
second session of U N C T A D , reaffirmed the objectives set for the scheme of 
supplementary financial measures at the f i r s t session and requested the 
Inter-governmental Group to continue its examination of the measures 
proposedo Subsequent developments led to the adoption of resolution 60 (V) 
by the Trade and. Development Board, containing a set of conclusions intended 
to constitute a basis for the preparation of a discretionary scheme of 
supplementary financing, and again invited. IBRD to consider working out 
arrangements for the scheme. In the interim, following consultations 
within IBRD, the conclusion was reached that even on the most optimistic 
assumption, there would be only very limited support on the part of 
the developed countries members of IDA for the provision "of 
additional resources for supplementary financing, at least during 




IBRD thought i t wise to defer further detailed consideration of a scheme 
for supplementary financial measures. Nevertheless, the Trade and 
Development Board, during the f i r s t part of i ts tenth session (September 1970), 
adopted a declaration stating that i t " . . . considers . no that i t is 
necessary for an effort to be made to work out the details of a discretionary 
scheme of supplementary financing that could be implemented within the 
World Bank group, and to assess the probable cost of such a scheme. The 
member countries of the World Bank would then be in a position to judge 
whether the additional resources required might be made available" .^/ 
The reason for the discrepancy between the Bank s^ decision to deier 
the preparation of proposals on a discretionary scheme of supplementary 
financing and the Board's statement requesting the Bank to give further 
consideration to the possibility of working out such a scheme, was the 
expressed concern of the developing countries that the establishment of 
a supplementary financing scheme would.not involve simply diverting the 
resources available,for basic development financing, but would be an 
addition to them. As the conclusions of the Inter-governmental Group 
on Supplementary Financing put i t : "It is the general consensus of the 
Group that i t would be of l i t t l e value merely to divert available 
resources from basic development finance for the purpose of supplementary 
financing".^/ Furthermore, i t should be remembered that i t is impossible 
to estimate the scale-of the resources required for supplementary financing 
until the basis of the scheme has been worked out, ' 
The Trade and Development Board's decision to request the World Bank 
to continue to examine the basis for a supplementary financing scheme has 
now been supported by a similar recommendation in the International 
Development Strategy, which gives grounds for thinking that the Bank 
will revise its decision to defer consideration of the scheme. 
41/ Report of the Trade and Development Board on -the f i rst part of i ts 
tenth se^eo.on (TD/B/327)* 30 September 1970, p*47/ 
h2J Ibid, s p. 48. ~ 
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8. Role of Special Drawing Rights in development financing 
The establishment of IMF1s system of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 
towards the end of 1969 was a means of increasing international liquidity, 
so that the growth of foreign exchange reserves could automatically adjust 
to the expansion of world production and trade« The -way i t was decided 
to apply SDR did not, however, follow closely the recommendation contained 
in annex A*IV«19 of the f i rs t session of UNCTAD, which stipulated that 
any provisions adopted in relation with the international monetary system 
should devote particular attention to the needs of the developing countries. 
Prior to the creation of SDR, international discussions had adopted the 
line that one way of meeting the needs of developing countries might be 
to establish a link between the creation of additional reserves and the 
provision of development financing» Eventually, the view prevailed that 
additional reserves and development resources were two aspects that should 
be kept strictly apart, and the SDR were therefore distributed in proportion 
to the quotas of member countries in IMF* Logical though i t appears, the 
system of distribution proved unfair, since i t meant in effect that a 
small group of countries received most of the additional reserves at virtually 
no cost whatsoever. The report of an Expert Group set up by UNCTAD stated 
in this respect: 
"One of the important features of the new system of Special 
Drawing Rights is that reserves can be treated costlessly, 
without such a surrender of real resources. It would be an 
expression of international solidarity and an auspicious beginning 
of the Second United Nations Development Decade i f the developed 
countries declared that this saving of resources, whether viewed 
at the national or at the world level, should accrue to those 
most in need, the poorest countries, and that the richer countries 13/ 
should have to earn at least part of the addition to their reserves»"—' 
Noting the agreement to create special drawing rights, at its second 
session UNCTAD adopted resolution 32 (II) in which i t invited Governments 
of States members of IMF "to continue to give careful consideration to 
43/ See International monetary reform and co-operation for development9 
Report of the Expert Group on International Monetary Issues 




applications from developing countries for increases of quotas so as to 
enable these countries to benefit more from the faci l it ies of the Fund", 
However, the resolution also urged States members of IMF to consider at 
an early date the forging of a link between the creation of SDR and the 
provision of external development finance. The Development Strategy 
includes a similar recommendation, adding that the question will , in 
any case, be examined before the allocation in 1972 of the remaining 
SDR created in 1970 and amounting to 9,500 million dollars. 
According to the various expert groups that have studied the matter, 
i t should be technically feasible to establish this link. Among the 
several suggestions put forward, two deserve special mention« Under the 
f i r s t , IMF would contribute directly to the International Development 
Association a certain proportion of the SDR allotted to developed 
countries - this would entail further amending IMF's statutes. Under 
the second, the developed, countries themselves would make a contribution 
to IDA in their respective currencies and in proportion to the SDR 
allocated to each country, A report of the Sub-committee on International 
Exchange and Payments of the United States Congress proposed amending 
IMF!s statutes to permit i t to retain 25 per cent of the SDR of the 
developed countries members of IDA, to be used for expanding the IDA'S 
financial development assistance. The report refers to the need to 
establish a link between the creation of special drawing rights and the 
provision of external development finance in the following terms: 
"In view of continuing and increasing needs of the developing 
nations for financial assistance, and considering the failure 
of the industrialized world to f u l f i l the commitments undertaken 
at the New Delhi UNCTAD conference in 1968 to furnish aid for 
development equivalent to one per cent of GNP, the wealthy countries 
should not be content to use the Special Drawing Rights facility for 
reserve creation alone. It can also be employed, without compromising 
its fundamental purpose or impairing its usefulness, to help raise 
financial transfers to the promised level," 44/ 
See A proposal to link reserve creation and development assistance, 
Report of the Sub-committee on International Exchange and Payments of 
the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington, 




The report goes on to point out some of the advantages of this 
formulas (1) i t would double IDA's loan capacity, raising i t to the previously 
recommended level of 1,000 million dollars annually; (2). i t would solve the 
balance-of-payments dif f iculties that have restricted, the provision of 
financial development assistance in certain countries; (3) i t would prevent 
tying financial, assistance to purchases from the donor countries and thus 
enable the recipients to buy on the most suitable markets; (4) i t would 
render budgetary allocations and annual legislation for granting financial 
assistance unnecessary» 
It can thus be said that general agreement is being reached on the 
need to link the creation of international monetary reserves vrf.th the 
provision of financial development assistance and that the only thing 
needed to establish this link is a policy decision by the developed 
countries. 


